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CONFRONTING COPS IN IMMIGRATION COURT
Mary Holper*
Immigration judges routinely use police reports to make life-altering decisions
in noncitizens lives. The word of the police officer prevents a detainee from being
released on bond, leads to negative discretionary decisions in relief from removal,
and can prove that a past crime fits within a ground of removability. Yet the police of-
ficers who write these reports rarely step foot in immigration court; immigration judges
rely on the hearsay document to make such critical decisions. This practice is espe-
cially troubling when the same police reports cannot be used against the noncitizen
in a criminal case without the officer testifying, due to both the Sixth Amendments
Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence, neither of which apply in
immigration court.
In these days of the increasing criminalization of immigration law and prioriti-
zation of deporting so-called criminal aliens,1 the police report problem is salient
and potentially impacts thousands of noncitizens every year. The scholarship has
focused on why other rights guaranteed in a criminal trialcourt-appointed counsel,
freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom from double jeopardy, proportionality
principles, and the Fourth Amendments exclusionary ruleshould apply to removal
proceedings.2 An overlooked criminal protection is the right to confront ones accuser
* Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank Dan
Kanstroom, Steve Legomsky, Hiroshi Motomura, Jennifer Chacón, Juliet Stumpf, Peter
Margulies, Dan Kesselbrenner, Phil Torrey, Kari Hong, Katie Tinto, Mark Brodin, Daniel
Lyons, Joe Liu, Mary Bilder, Brian Galle, Mark Spiegel, Natalya Shnitser, Paul Tremblay,
Alan Minuskin, Jessica Chicco, Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Jen Klein, Emma Winger, Wendy
Wayne, and Jonathan Bard for their valuable feedback. I also would like to thank Maria
Mercedes Gaitan, Justin DeRosa, and Aileen Kim for their helpful research assistance.
1 See generally Criminal Alien Program, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://
www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program.
2 See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115, 119, 16063 (1999) (arguing that the current deportation laws violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE
L.J.1563,162427 (2010) (proposing the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule in removal proceedings); Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Con-
stitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting
Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2008) (arguing for an application of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule due to widespread constitutional violations by immigra-
tion officers and a fundamental change in immigration court practice since Lopez-Mendoza
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in immigration court. This Article seeks to fill the gap in the literature by discussing
the application of this important criminal procedure right in immigration law.
Part I of the Article outlines the police report problem by discussing the four
situations in which police reports are used in immigration court, why police reports
are unreliable, and the scope of the problem. Part II discusses criminal laws treat-
ment of police reports, focusing on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
which provides the constitutional justification for excluding police reports in crimi-
nal cases. Part III discusses the use of hearsay evidence in immigration cases, where
hearsay is allowed due to the characterization of removal proceedings as civil, not
criminal. While there has been a trend to reject unreliable documents under the due
process fundamental fairness test in immigration cases, this trend has stopped short
when an immigration judge relies on a police report, especially when making a nega-
tive discretionary decision. Reviewing courts are more likely to critique immigration
judges reliance on police reports to establish removability, however. The Article
offers an explanation of this disparate treatment: as courts and the agency began to
reject the categorical approachthe time-honored, elements-based method for de-
termining whether a conviction can lead to deportationthe police report problem
was exposed, causing courts to critique the use of police reports to establish facts in
removal cases.
Part IV examines the right to confront police officers by exploring three different
ways to conceptualize removal proceedings: (1) in light of the Supreme Courts
2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,3 deportation should be considered punishment,
thus guaranteeing the application of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause;
(2) under the Mathews v. Eldridge4 case-by-case balancing test of the Due Process
Clause, courts should balance the interests at stake and adopt a right to confrontation
was decided); Stephen H. Legomsky, Recent Development, Deportation of an Alien for a
Marijuana Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi v. United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), 13 SAN DIEGO
L.REV.454(1976) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis
should apply to deportation for marijuana convictions); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retro-
active Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L.REV. 97 (1998) (arguing
that the principles against retroactivity embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply
to deportation proceedings); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why
at Least Some of the Constitutions Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN.
L.REV. 305, 33940 (2000) (arguing that the Eighth Amendments requirement that the pun-
ishment be proportional to the offense, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Sixth Amendments
right to counsel should apply in deportation proceedings); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration
Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINEL.REV. 415, 41718 (2012) (arguing
that removal is sufficiently punitive to trigger constitutional proportionality review pur-
suant to the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendments Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause).
3 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
4 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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and cross-examination of police officers in immigration court; and (3) if deportation
is conceptualized as quasi-criminal and thus deserving of some, but not all, of the
protections guaranteed at a criminal trial, one of those protections should be the right
to confront ones accuser, especially when the accuser is a police officer.
Part V explores the proposed right to confrontation in immigration court: that
immigration judges not admit police reports into evidence against a noncitizen unless
the police officers are subject to cross-examination.
I. THE POLICE REPORT PROBLEM
A. Uses of Police Reports in Immigration Cases
There are four phases of a removal case5 in which an immigration judge may rely
on police reports: to decide (1) whether to grant a detained noncitizen release on bond;
(2) whether a noncitizen is eligible for a form of relief from removal; (3) whether
to grant discretionary relief; and, in limited circumstances, (4) whether a noncitizen
is deportable for the reasons charged by the government. For the first three types of
decisions, the burden is on the noncitizen.6 For findings of deportability, the burden
is on the government.7
The first use of police reports in immigration court in which police reports play
a major role is decisions on bond. Unless a noncitizen is subject to mandatory de-
tention, which applies if he is removable for several crime-related grounds of
removability,8 he must show that he is not a danger or a flight risk.9 The Board of
5 Prior to 1996, noncitizens who were in the process ofbeingdeported after havingbeenad-
mitted to the United States were considered to be in deportation proceedings, whereas those
who were stopped attempting to enter the United States were placed in exclusion proceedings.
The 1996 reforms to the INA combined these into removal proceedings. See 5 CHARLES
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01 (Matthew Bender rev. ed.,
2014). This Article uses both the terms deportation and removal to describe the expulsion
of noncitizens, although the proceedings are formally known as removal proceedings.
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2012) (requiring in applications for relief from removal
that a noncitizen prove that he satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements and merits
a favorable exercise of discretion if relief is discretionary); In re Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140,
141 (B.I.A. 2009) (holding that in bond hearings, the noncitizen bears the burden of proving
he will not present danger to persons or property).
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (requiring the government to prove deportability by clear
and convincing evidence). The Supreme Court, in a 1966 case, required that the government
prove deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. See Woodby v. INS,
385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). However, in a 2009 decision, the Court cited the burden of proof
to be clear and convincing evidence. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009).
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
9 See In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976).
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Immigration Appeals (Board) has held that judges must first decide whether a
noncitizen is a danger to the community; if he passes this hurdle, then the judge may
determine whether he is a flight risk.10 Bond is a highly discretionary decision where
judges may consider police reports, even from dismissed charges, to make negative
inferences about a persons dangerousness or flight risk.11
The second use of police reports is to determine whether a noncitizen is eligible
for relief from removal. Once the government has proven that the noncitizen is
removable, the burden then shifts to the noncitizen to prove that he is both eligible
for and, if discretionary, that he merits discretionary relief.12 For example, applicants
for asylum and withholding of removal must prove that they have not been convicted
of a particularly serious crime.13 The Board has set forth a test for determining
whether an offense is particularly serious, which begins with a more categorical analy-
sis of the nature of the offense and then yields to an investigation of the underlying
facts of the offense to determine whether the offense indicates that the applicant
would be a danger to the community.14 Offenses that are more violent in nature have
been found to be particularly serious crimes.15 For example, a police report recount-
ing the victims descriptions of the harm when there has been an assault conviction
can factor into the particularly serious crime analysis.16 Another example is the waiver
10 See In re Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 141.
11 In a case in which the Author represented a noncitizen seeking release on bond, the
noncitizen had been charged in state court with possession of a firearm; unbeknownst to him,
a friend who was staying with him had brought a firearm into the house. The criminal charges
were dismissed due to insufficient evidence, yet because of his lack of immigration status,
he was referred to removal proceedings. During the bond hearing, the immigration judge
considered all of the evidence, including the noncitizens own words denying knowledge of
the firearm in his house and his wifes declaration stating the same, yet denied bond, stating,
That police report is really damning. 
12 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (describing burdens of proof in removal proceedings).
13 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012).
14 See In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (noting that for particularly
serious crime determination, a judge must consider the nature of the conviction, the cir-
cumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most
importantly, whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be
a danger to the community); see also In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007)
(If the elements of the offense do not potentially bring the crime into a category of par-
ticularly serious crimes, the individual facts and circumstances of the offense are of no
consequence . . . .).
15 See, e.g., In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 337, 343 (concluding that felony menacing,
a crime against the person, is a particularly serious crime); In re B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427, 431
(B.I.A. 1991) (holding that aggravated battery, which involved the use of a firearm, was a
particularly serious crime); In re Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423, 42526 (B.I.A.
1986) (concluding that respondents burglary in the first degree conviction, which involved
a deadly weapon or physical injury to a non-participant, was a particularly serious crime).
16 The Author represented a noncitizen who sought asylum and withholding of removal
because he faced persecution in Kenya due to his sexual orientation. He had been convicted
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of inadmissibility for drug offenses, which requires a noncitizen to prove that his
offense involved simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana.17 Police
reports detailing the amount of marijuana found at the scene of a crime and whether
implements to weigh or sell the drug, which are evidence of an intent to sell, can be
used to determine that a noncitizen is not eligible for this waiver.18
The third use of police reports is in deciding whether a noncitizen merits discre-
tionary relief from removal. For example, cancellation of removal is a discretionary
form of relief that is available to lawful permanent residents who are removable
usually for a criminal convictionyet are asking for a second chance by demon-
strating to the judge that the positive factors in their lives outweigh the negative.19
Discretionary decisions are quite common in immigration court,20 and the Board has
authorized judges to use police reports in these decisions.21 In addition to police re-
ports from convictions, police reports from dismissed charges are used to determine
whether a noncitizen merits discretionary relief. Although the Board has instructed
judges to give these police reports less weight because the charges were dismissed,22
judges often combine police reports from both convictions and dismissed charges to
paint an image of a person as an unsavory character.23
of assault, and the police report stated that his girlfriend told the police she sustained injuries
when he hit her. His girlfriend testified at the removal hearing, denying that he hit her, but
the judge found his crime to be particularly serious because of the contents of the police
report. See also Solis v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 832, 83436 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding Boards
decision that a noncitizen was convicted of a particularly serious crime based on the contents
of a police report about the circumstances leading up to a conviction for delivering a con-
trolled substance).
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012).
18 See, e.g., In re Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 713, 724 (B.I.A. 1988) (discussed infra
Part III.B).
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2012); In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 1112 (B.I.A. 1998)
(laying out factors for the balancing test that judges must use when considering whether a
noncitizen merits cancellation of removal in the exercise of discretion).
20 Asylum, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and voluntary departure are com-
mon forms of discretionary relief regularly considered in immigration court. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (2012) (asylum); § 1229b (cancellation of removal); § 1229c (voluntary departure);
§ 1255 (adjustment of status).
21 See In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Grijalva, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 722.
22 See In re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 42 (B.I.A. 1995) (discussed infra
Part III.B).
23 In a recent case, the Author represented a noncitizen who was applying for adjustment
of status, a discretionary form of relief. The client had been convicted of possessing a fake
identification document and assaulting his children. He also had been arrested for hitting his
wife, although these charges were dismissed. The judge denied relief based on the history of
domestic violence. In the oral decision, the judge read the contents of each police report as
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The final use of a police report is to determine whether a noncitizen is deport-
able for one of the criminal grounds of deportability.24 Because the majority of crime-
related grounds of deportability require a conviction,25 the Board historically has
used the categorical approach to determine whether a criminal conviction fits an
immigration category such as aggravated felony.26 Following this approach, judges
first must examine the elements of a noncitizens statute of conviction; if those ele-
ments line up with the elements of the immigration crime (i.e. aggravated felony), the
offense is an aggravated felony.27 Only when the statute of conviction is divisible
that is, contains multiple criminal offenses, some of which are aggravated felonies and
some of which are notcan the judge consult a limited selection of documents
those contained in the record of conviction.28 The underlying facts are irrelevant to
determining deportability under the categorical approach.29
Strictly applying the categorical approach, it would appear that police reports
should never be used to determine whether a noncitizen is removable for an offense
though they were facts proven beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding his wifes testimony
that there had been no domestic violence in the home.
24 The criminal grounds of deportability include crimes involving moral turpitude, aggra-
vated felonies, firearms offenses, high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint, failure
to register as a sex offender, controlled substance offenses, certain miscellaneous crimes
relating to sabotage and treason, and crimes of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012).
25 The only criminal ground of deportability that does not require a conviction is a vio-
lation of a restraining order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). In contrast, there are several
criminal grounds of inadmissibility (the inability for one to get a U.S. visa or become a perma-
nent resident) that do not require a conviction. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), (H)(I)
(2012) (deeming inadmissible any noncitizen the Attorney General has reason to believe is
a drug trafficker, human trafficker, or money launderer). The grounds of inadmissibility
apply in immigration court either when a noncitizen is seeking relief that requires him to be
admissible to the United States (such as adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident)
or when a noncitizen has not yet been admitted to the United States (such as a noncitizen who
was paroled into the United States for humanitarian reasons or who entered the United States
without inspection). See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (adjustment of status); § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(humanitarian parole); § 1182(a)(6)(A) (deeming inadmissible noncitizens present in vio-
lation of the law). There are also lawful permanent residents who face the grounds of inad-
missibility because, upon a return from a trip abroad, the statute deems them to be seeking
an admission if they have committed an offense identified in the criminal grounds of
inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012).
26 See, e.g., In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 334 (B.I.A. 1996) (describing the
categorical approach).
27 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (describing the categorical
approach).
28 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 228182 (2013); Moncrieffe, 133 S.
Ct. at 1690.
29 See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684.
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such as an aggravated felony. Indeed, in applying the categorical approach, the
Board has prohibited judges from relying on police reports.30 However, decisions
by the Attorney General,31 Board,32 and Supreme Court33 have created exceptions
to this time-honored approach in immigration law, allowing more findings of fact
by immigration judges to determine deportability.34 Thus, police reports have played
30 See In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (B.I.A. 1996).
31 In 2008, Attorney General Mukasey, in In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Atty
Gen. 2008), permitted immigration judges to use any evidence to determine whether an
offense was a crime involving moral turpitude if the statute was divisible. Although several
circuit courts have refused to uphold Silva-Trevino, it still remains good law in other circuits.
See, e.g., Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 2014); Olivas-Motta v.
Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 2013); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir.
2012); Fajardo v. U.S. Atty Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); Jean-Louis v. Atty
Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 482 (3d Cir. 2009).
32 See, e.g., In re Gertsenshteyn, 24 I. & N. Dec. 111, 11516 (B.I.A. 2007) (creating a
bifurcated approach for analyzing prostitution aggravated felony offenses under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii), which requires judges to use the categorical approach to determine
whether the offense involves prostitution but permits judges to use a factual inquiry to
determine whether the offense was committed for commercial advantage); see also In re
Introcaso, 26 I. & N. Dec. 304, 309 (B.I.A. 2014) (applying the circumstance-specific
approach in a visa petition case involving the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006 to determine whether a petitioner has been convicted of a specified offense against
a minor); In re Davey, 26 I. & N. Dec. 37, 3940 (B.I.A. 2012) (applying the bifurcated
approach to the controlled substance ground of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)
and holding that judges must use the categorical approach to determine if the offense
involved was a controlled substance crime and the circumstance-specific approach to de-
termine whether the offense involved simple possession for ones own use of thirty grams
or less of marijuana); In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 322 (B.I.A. 2007) (applying the
bifurcated approach to another aggravated felony ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and
holding that judges should use the categorical approach to determine whether the offense
involves fraud, but they may use a factual inquiry to determine whether the loss to the victim
exceeded $10,000).
33 In Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), the Supreme Court applied the bifurcated
approach for analyzing fraud aggravated felony offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i);
the Court held that judges should use the categorical approach to determine whether the
offense involves fraud, but may use a factual inquiry to determine the loss to the victim. See
557 U.S. at 40.
34 Until the Supreme Courts 2013 decisions in Moncrieffe and Descamps, it appeared
that the categorical approach was dying a slow death. In Moncrieffe, the Court, strictly
applying the categorical approach, held that a noncitizen was not deportable for a drug dis-
tribution conviction. 133 S. Ct. at 1690. In Descamps, the Court strictly applied the cate-
gorical approach to determine that a criminal defendant could not have his sentence enhanced
under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) due to a prior conviction for burglary.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 228182 (2013). Because the categorical ap-
proach in both sentencing and immigration proceedings are identical, the Board has applied
ACCA cases to the immigration context. See In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349,
35354 (B.I.A. 2014).
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a role in more decisions on deportability since the creation of exceptions to the cate-
gorical approach.35
B. Why Police Reports Are Unreliable
Why is it problematic that an immigration judge assumes the truth of police
reports when deciding a case? Critical decisions turn on facts such as whether a
noncitizen was intending to sell or simply possess marijuana, yet the police officer
does not appear in immigration court to describe his observations of an alleged
sale.36 Also critical to many cases is a victims description of the harm suffered, yet
the police report is often double hearsay, relying on a statement from the victim. If
neither the officer nor the victim appears in immigration court, how does a judge
determine whether the victim had a motive to lie to the police, or whether she later
recanted her statements?
Courts have always disfavored hearsay, which is an out-of-court statement
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, because it is unreliable.37 Since
the person who asserts the fact is not present in court, hearsay cannot be tested by
cross-examination.38 In 1975, the prohibition against the use of hearsay was codified
in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).39 The rule against hearsay, however, is
35 During a presentation by a local immigration judge in the Authors Immigration Clinic
seminar, a question was posed about whether the judge found the fact-finding on crimes
involving moral turpitude to be complicated following the Attorney Generals decision in
Silva-Trevino. See supra note 31. The judge replied, I just look at the police reports.
36 See, e.g., In re Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 713, 724 (B.I.A. 1988).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1409 (3d Cir. 1994) (Hearsay is
generally inadmissible because the statement is inherently untrustworthy: the declarant may
not have been under oath at the time of the statement, his or her credibility cannot be evalu-
ated at trial, and he or she cannot be cross-examined. (quoting United States v. Console,
13 F.3d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1993))); ERIC D. GREEN ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 405 (3d ed. 2000).
38 See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 32 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974) (stating that cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth).
39 See FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay as a statement that: (1) the declarant does not
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement). The historical backdrop to the
codification dates back to 1942, when the American Law Institute adopted the Model Code
of Evidence; although the Model Code stimulated much discussion and debate, it was not
adopted by any jurisdiction. George W. Pugh, Foreword, The Federal Rules of Evidence, 36
LA. L. REV. 59, 62 (1975). In 1961, a Special Committee was formed to determine whether
a federal evidence code was feasible and desirable; when this committee answered affirma-
tively, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
to draft the proposed rules. Id. at 63. The rules ultimately were promulgated by the Supreme
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riddled with exceptions.40 The exceptions generally indicate the documents trust-
worthiness.41
A police report likely fits within the public records exception at FRE 803(8),
which reads:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, re-
gardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
. . . .
Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it
sets out: (i) the offices activities; (ii) a matter observed while
under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case,
a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or (iii) in a
civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual
findings from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) neither
the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack
of trustworthiness.42
Police reports are public records because they document a matter observed while
under a legal duty to report or factual findings from a legally authorized investi-
gation.43
Court in 1972. Id. The House Judiciary Committee, and subsequently the Senate Judiciary
Committee, then held extensive hearings on the rules and proposed several amendments,
which led to both a House and a Senate version of the rules. Id. at 64. The two chambers
reached agreement, and the rules were enacted into law and became effective on July 1,
1975. Id.
40 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980); see also FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (listing
exceptions to the hearsay rule). FRE 807, called the residual exception, permits the
admission of hearsay that does not fit within one of the specified exceptions in FRE 803 and
804, when
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the
proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it
will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.
FED. R. EVID. 807.
41 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.); Fred Warren Bennett, Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8): The Use of Public Records in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 229, 231 (1997) (citing 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEINS EVIDENCE 803-261 (Supp. Nov. 1995)) (stating that the hearsay exceptions are
premised on the principles of necessity and trustworthiness).
42 FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
43 Id.
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The public records exception exists because these documents generally are reli-
able, since public officials are presumed to perform their duties properly and generally
lack a motive to falsify information.44 Also, it is believed that a public record is often
more accurate than the potentially hazy memory of a public official who must deal
with hundreds of instances of similar conduct.45 Finally, courts have justified this ex-
ception by the inconvenience of calling to the witness stand all over the country
government officers who have made in the course of their duties thousands of similar
written hearsay statements concerning events coming within their jurisdictions.46
When a police report is written, does the source of the information or other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness?47 Police reports are written very
early in an investigation, when officers are first starting to form theories of what
happened in a criminal case. As the Fourth Circuit wrote, [P]olice reports . . . often
contain little more than unsworn witness statements and initial impressions. . . .
Further, because [they] are generated early in an investigation, they do not account
for later events, such as witness recantations, amendments, or corrections.48 Also,
there are often multiple police reports; another report from the same case may include
additional witnesses or evidence that call into question some of the facts in the
first police report.49 Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit reasoned that police reports
44 Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:EVIDENCE § 6759, at 663 (interim ed., 1992)); see also
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committees notes to paragraph (8) (Justification for the [public
records] exception is the assumption that a public official will perform his duty properly and
the unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the record.).
45 Felzcerek, 75 F.3d at 116 (citing Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120, 123 (9th
Cir. 1952)); see also United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, PUBLIC RECORDS § 454) (stating that the
reasons underlying the public records exception are the presumed trustworthiness of public
documents prepared in the discharge of official functions, and the necessity of using such
documents, due to the likelihood that a public official would have no independent memory of a
particular action or entry where his duties require the constant repetition of routine tasks).
46 See Wong Wing Foo, 196 F.2d at 123; see also United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608,
614 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that a consideration of the public records exemption is the great
inconvenience that would be caused to public business if public officers had to be called to
court to verify in person every fact they certify). Because public records are presumed to
be reliable, an opponent of this evidence must come forward with enough negative factors
to persuade the court not to admit it. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995);
Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1992).
47 The Advisory Committees notes cite four factors that are indicative of trustworthiness:
(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or experience of the official; (3)
whether a hearing was held and the level at which conducted; [and] (4) possible motivation
problems. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committees notes to paragraph 8 (citations omitted).
48 Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 48384 (4th Cir. 2012).
49 Email from Wendy Wayne, Dir., Immigration Impact Unit, Comm. for Pub. Counsel
Servs., to author (Aug. 11, 2014) (on file with the author). Wayne cites as an example con-
flicting police reports in which one report describes evidence or statements suggesting
2015] CONFRONTING COPS IN IMMIGRATION COURT 685
are helpful in guiding further investigation, helping prosecutors and defense counsel
locate useful witnesses, and serving as a contemporaneous recollection of what the
officer observed and what the officer understood people to have told him.50 But,
he reasoned, police reports are not especially useful instruments for finding out
what persons charged actually did.51 This is because [a]ll the defects of hearsay,
double hearsay, and triple hearsay apply, since people may speak to the police despite
lack of personal knowledge and lack of adequate observation, may be misunder-
stood, and what they say may be misreported. People sometimes lie or exaggerate
when they talk to the police.52
Motive is one reason why police reports may be untrustworthy.53 Police reports
are prepared in anticipation of litigation, and thus an officer may be attempting to
improve the litigation position of the prosecution at trial.54 Motive in any witnesss
statements is important as well, as witnesses may lie or exaggerate to the police for
a variety of reasons.55 The nature of the confrontation between the police and a
criminal defendant also is inherently adversarial, raising concerns about reliability
of police reports.56 This was one of the concerns that guided Congress, when adopt-
ing the FRE, to specifically exclude police reports from the public records exception
possession with intent to distribute, while another report in the same case is written by an
officer who saw evidence of possession for personal use. Id.
50 Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 91819 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
51 Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2013) (While
police reports may be demonstrably reliable evidence of the fact that an arrest was made they
are significantly less reliable evidence of whether the allegations of criminal conduct they
contain are true. (quoting United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986))).
52 Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 91819 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citing
Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 48384).
53 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committees notes to paragraph 8.
54 In the Advisory Committees notes to FRE 803(8), motivational problems include
those raised by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman. See id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109 (1943)). In Palmer, the Court carved out an exception to the shop book rule
for those business records that were prepared in anticipation of litigation. Palmer, 318 U.S.
at 11314; see also United States v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1979) (This hearsay
exception [for public records] is designed to allowadmission of official recordsand reports pre-
pared by an agency or government office for purposes independent of specific litigation.);
Bennett, supra note 41, at 251 (Government agencies tend to be neutral and objective with
respect to matters reported in official records, particularly when the records are prepared with-
out an eye toward litigation.).
55 See Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 919 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
56 See Bell, 785 F.2d at 64344 (finding in a probation revocation hearing that urinalysis
laboratory reports bear substantial indicia of reliability, but reasoning that police reports are
not as inherently reliable because [t]he relationship between police officers and those whom
they arrest is much more personal and adversarial in nature than that between chemists and
those whose urine they test).
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to the hearsay rule when used against a defendant in a criminal case.57 As stated in
the Senate Report recommending adoption of the FRE:
Ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that observations by
police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of
the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials
in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confronta-
tion between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.58
Additionally, the Honorable William L. Hungate, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, when presenting the final version of the FRE,
stated, Police reports, especially in criminal cases, tend to be one-sided and self-
serving. They are frequently prepared for the use of prosecutors, who use such
reports in deciding whether to prosecute.59
Scholars have discussed the problem of police officers falsifying information
on reports.60 Many have commented on the ultimate control police have over the
construction of the facts of a criminal casethe way police record facts creates the
framework for how judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys think about the case.61
57 See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064;
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7111
(Statement by the Hon. William L. Hungate, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Upon Presenting the Conference Report on H.R. 5463 to the House for
Final Consideration) [hereinafter Hungate Statement]; see also Bell, 785 F.2d at 644 (We
note that Congress exhibited similar doubts about the reliability of such reports when it
specifically excluded them from the public records exception to the hearsay rule in criminal
cases.). The other concern underlying the exclusion of police reports from criminal trials
was the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See infra Part II.
58 S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064.
59 Hungate Statement, supra note 57, at 7111.
60 See, e.g., Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 513 (2010) (collecting evidence of police lies from video and audio records, judges
in-court observations, jury findings of police perjury, commissions dedicated to studying
police corruption, an empirical studyof Chicagos criminal justice system, and circumstantial
evidence from the Innocence Project and other studies); see also David N. Dorfman, Proving
the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 460 (1999) (Police officers
can be expected to omit, redact, and even lie on their police reports, sworn or unsworn.);
Stanley Z. Fisher, Just the Facts, Maam: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993); Wilson, supra, at 8 n.50
(collecting cases in which judges found that police had lied in their sworn statements);
Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 324 (2005) (The belief that police falsification is ubiquitous is
widely held.).
61 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 60, at 4 (Through their reports, the police have funda-
mental control over the construction of [the] facts for a case, and all other actors (the
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The scholarship discusses two main functions of a police report: 1) if an arrest is
made, to recite facts obtained or observed to support probable cause; and 2) if an
arrest is not made, to guide further investigation.62 Since the officer must tell the
same story during a later suppression hearing, there is incentive to lie in the report
to justify unlawful searches and arrests.63 Thus, police often justify their lies by
convincing themselves that lying will ensure that a guilty and dangerous defendant
is not released or acquitted.64 David Dorfman has discussed incentives to conduct
false arrests and the reasons why police overcharge on an arrest report: to ag-
grandize themselves, to anticipate the inevitable reduction of charges during plea-
bargaining, or as an essentially adversarial act against a person the police officer
presumes is guilty of the more serious crime, despite a lack of sufficient evidence.65
Stanley Fisher wrote that police lie in reports to avoid potential embarrassment or
civil liability for a false arrest, to convince the public that they are doing some-
thing about crime, and because they have an interest in punishing the guilty and a
psychological stake in believing that a particular suspect . . . is . . . guiltythus
prosecutor, the judge, the defense lawyer) must work from the framework of facts as con-
structed by the police. (alteration in original) (quoting Richard V. Ericson, Rules for Police
Deviance, in ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE DEVIANCE: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTROL 96
(Clifford D. Shearing ed., 1981))); Wilson, supra note 60, at 1516 (The police decide who
to interview, where to look, what documents to collect, what people and places to leave unin-
vestigated, what questions to ask, and with what tone to ask them. Police flavor and shape
every case from beginning to end. Without [the police] . . . few criminals could be convicted.).
62 See Dorfman, supra note 60, at 492; Fisher, supra note 60, at 78.
63 See Dorfman, supra note 60, at 492; see also Zeidman, supra note 60, at 322, 324
(discussing findings of the Mollen Commission, which was assembled in response to
corruption in police precincts in New York City, that corrupt officers manufactured facts
to justify unlawful searches and arrests, one of which was the dropsy testimony that the
person dropped a bag . . . as the officers approached (alteration in original) (quoting
COMMN TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPT, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMN REPORT 1994, at 37)).
64 Wilson, supra note 60, at 4. Other motives to lie include gaining the trust of a suspect,
convincing a suspect to admit criminal behavior, and covering up wrongdoing by themselves
or other officers. See id.; see also Dorfman, supra note 60, at 461 (Police will commit
perjury to further the prosecution of a citizen by adding inculpatory evidence to better secure
a conviction, to gild the lily of police conduct, or merely to sanitize the record of uncom-
fortable facts. (footnotes omitted)); Fisher, supra note 60, at 15 ([O]fficers justify
deception in terms of the need to safeguard competing values that are perceived as superior
to truth-telling. Justifications . . . include the maintenance of order, self-protection, and the
apprehension and punishment of the guilty. (footnotes omitted)); id. at 12 n.46 (discussing
a social scientists observations of an urban police department that lying is a routine way
of managing legal impedimentswhether to protect fellow officers or to compensate for
what [the policeman] views as limitations the courts have placed on his capacity to deal with
criminals (alteration in original) (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception By Police, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 40, 4243 (1982))).
65 Dorfman, supra note 60, at 475.
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they lie to ensure conviction of the guilty.66 A major problem with police lies,
Melanie Wilson noted, is with the legal system, which treats the police as if they
are impartial fact gatherers, trained and motivated to gather facts both for and
against guilt, rather than biased advocates attempting to disprove innocence, which
is the reality.67
C. Scope of the Police Report Problem
What is the scope of the police report problem? While there are not statistics
available to report the number of immigration court decisions in which a police
report played a role, in fiscal year 2013, immigration courts nationwide completed
253,942 cases.68 Of these, 63,313 were detainee cases and 57,132 were bond cases.69
There is a significant correlation between criminal activity and immigration deten-
tion;70 thus, it is likely that a significant number of these detainee and/or bond cases
involved judges looking at police reports. Of course, these numbers do not account
for the large number of immigration cases that are diverted out of the regular adjudi-
cation system through fast-track procedures such as expedited removal, adminis-
trative removal, and reinstatement of removal.71 These numbers also do not account
for the thousands of decisions by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to
deny an application for immigration status where a police report played a role in the
discretionary denial.72
66 See Fisher, supra note 60, at 817.
67 Wilson, supra note 60, at 3.
68 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK A5 tbl.2, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf.
69 Id. at A6 tbl.2A, G1 fig.11.
70 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 136172 (2014) (tracking how immigration detention became part of
the punitive consequences for drug-related criminal activity during 1980s war on drugs); see
also id. at 1379 (The federal governments fifteen-year history of intermingling immigration
detention and crime-fighting legislation strongly implies that Congress and, at times, the
president viewed this as a criminal law enforcement tool.).
71 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012) (authorizing expedited removal for noncitizens arriving
at a port of entry who do not have proper documentation to enter); § 1231(a)(5) (authorizing
reinstatement of removal for those already ordered removed in the past); § 1228 (authorizing
administrative removal for certain noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies). See gen-
erally Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009) (discussing diversions from the immigration adjudication system).
72 The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) is the branch of the Department
of Homeland Security responsible for considering affirmative applications such as those for
adjustment of status, waivers of inadmissibility, asylum, and naturalization. See RICHARD D.
STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 2:2 (2014).
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The police report problem takes on added significance when one considers the
Obama administrations focus on deporting criminal aliens. As Janet Napolitano,
the former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, wrote to Senator
Dick Durbin in 2011, one of the departments priorities for enforcement was iden-
tifying and removing criminal aliens.73 She wrote that, thanks to the use of the
Secure Communities Program, over fifty percent of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) removals in fiscal year 2010 were convicted criminals.74 In
addition, a 2011 memo from ICE Director John Morton directed ICE agents on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.75 The memo stated that in furtherance of ICEs
enforcement priorities, the following negative factors should . . . prompt particular
care and consideration[:] . . . serious felons, repeat offenders, or individuals with a
lengthy criminal record of any kind [and] known gang members or other individuals
who pose a clear danger to public safety.76 A November 2014 ICE memo regarding
prosecutorial discretion, which superceded the 2011 Morton Memo, lists as Priority
One for enforcement those who have been convicted of a felony, aggravated
felony, or an offense for which an element was active participation in a criminal
street gang.77 The same memo lists as Priority Two those convicted of multiple
misdemeanors or certain significant misdemeanors such as domestic violence.78
ICEs statistics indicate that in fiscal year 2013, in furtherance of its priority to
remove criminal aliens, ICE conducted 133,551 removals of individuals appre-
hended in the interior of the U.S.; of these, eighty-two percent previously had been
convicted of a crime.79
The increased cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement creates more
opportunities for police reports to factor into critical decisions in immigration cases.
For example, 287(g) agreements, whereby state or local officers enforce federal immi-
gration law,80 allows ICE to use police reports to meet its burden to prove alienage,
since a noncitizen first makes admissions of alienage to a police officer. Efforts such
73 Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Sec., to Senator Dick Durbin (Aug.
18, 2011), available at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id
=1180a746-c6d4-4fe9-b11f-cf9be50b6226.
74 Id.
75 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
All Field Office Dirs., et al. (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo].
76 Id.
77 Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Secy, U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al. (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion
.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memo].
78 Id.
79 See Enforcement & Removal Operations, FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, IMMIGR.
&CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immi
gration-removals.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
80 See Immigration & Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012).
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as ICEs Operation Community Shield that target criminal street gangs through the
immigration enforcement system allow increased use of police reports to deny bond
and discretionary decisions because of a noncitizens alleged membership in or affili-
ation with a criminal street gang, even if law enforcement chooses not to prosecute
such criminal activity.81
Immigration judges reliance on police reports in life-altering decisions in non-
citizens lives clearly is a problem within the immigration adjudication system. How
would those same police reports be treated in criminal law?
II. POLICE REPORTS AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
FRE 803(8) expressly prohibits the use of a police report against a defendant in
a criminal case, even if it meets the definition of a public record.82 One reason is
that such statements are inherently unreliable.83 A second reason is that Congress
was attempting to avoid a collision between the hearsay rule and the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment.84 What were the constitutional issues that concerned
81 See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal
of the Criminal Street Gang Member, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317 (2007). Additionally,
the Secure Communities Program, discontinued since November 2014, allowed state and
local officials to run arrestees through DHS databases to identify removable noncitizens,
leading to detention and deportation even if there was no criminal conviction. See Chacón,
supra note 2, at 159596; Johnson Memo, supra note 77. Noncitizens referred to ICE through
this program could be denied bond and relief from removal based on the police reports from
that initial encounter with law enforcement. Secure Communities was replaced with the
Priority Enforcement Program, where ICE should only seek transfer of a noncitizen from
state or local custody when that person fits within certain enforcement priorities, most of
which require convictions. See id.
82 FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
83 See supra Part I.B.
84 United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Oates,
560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977) ([The] efforts to avert the possibility of conflict between the
hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause find their most emphatic expression in FRE
803(8) . . . .). In Oates, the Second Circuit carefully examined the legislative history of FRE
803(8) to conclude that a chemists report that analyzed a substance it determined to be
heroin could not be admitted as a hearsay document when the witness was unavailable. 560
F.2d at 64, 6869. The court reasoned that the legislative intent to make police and law
enforcement reports absolutely inadmissible against a criminal defendant would be mean-
ingless if they could come in via other exceptions, such as the residual exception or the
business records exception. See id. at 7078. The court stated,
[T]he pervasive fear of the draftsmen and of Congress that interference
with an accuseds right to confrontation would occur was the reason
why in criminal cases evaluative reports of government agencies and
law enforcement reports were expressly denied the benefit to which
they might otherwise be entitled under FRE 803(8).
Id. at 78.
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Congress when prohibiting the use of police reports against a defendant in a criminal
case, notwithstanding their classification as public records?
A. The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment reads, In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .85 In a criminal case, the police officer who wrote a report detailing
what facts led up to the arrest is a witness against the accused. The Confrontation
Clause gives the criminal defendant the right to meet the police officer face-to-face
in court and to have the officers testimony tested through cross-examination.86
In the 1980 case Ohio v. Roberts,87 the Court interpreted the Confrontation
Clause to allow admission of an out-of-court statement if it fell within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception or carried particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.88
Scholars criticized the Courts decision as demoting what was formerly a consti-
tutional right protecting the accused to essentially a minor adjunct to evidence law.89
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington,90 the Court overruled its decision in Roberts,
holding that when the Confrontation Clause applies, it guarantees a defendant the
opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the hearsay statement.91 The Crawford
Court held, however, that the Confrontation Clause only applied to testimonial
statementsones made under circumstances which would lead an objective wit-
ness reasonably to believe that [they] would be available for use at a later trial.92
Thus, the Court found that to admit the testimonial statement of the defendants
85 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (Confrontation means more than being
allowed to confront the witness physically. Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause
hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination. (alteration in
original) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965))).
87 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
88 Id. at 66. Jeffrey Bellin discusses the logic of Roberts: (1) [T]he Sixth Amendment
mandates confrontation to ensure that testimony is reliable, and thus (2) if the reliability of
hearsay can be established in some other way (for example, by a judicial determination of
reliability), confrontation is not required. Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Con-
frontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1873 (2012).
89 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLAL. REV. 557, 558 (1988); see also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search
for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998); Jonakait, supra, at 574 (The confrontation
clause is not now a constitutional provision controlling evidence law. Instead, evidence law
dominates the confrontation right.).
90 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
91 Id. at 59.
92 Id. at 5152 (quoting Brief for National Assn for Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
692 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:675
wife, whose statement would otherwise be admissible under evidence law because
she was unavailable due to the spousal privilege, violated the defendants confron-
tation rights.93 The only out-of-court testimonial statements the Crawford Court would
allow were those where the defendant had made the witness unavailable by wrong-
doing because the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.94
The Court in a 2012 case summarized its post-Crawford test for what charac-
teristics of a hearsay document prompt Confrontation Clause concerns:
The abuses that the Court has identified as prompting the adoption
of the Confrontation Clause shared the following two charac-
teristics: (a) they involved out-of-court statements having the
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging
in criminal conduct and (b) they involved formalized statements
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.95
Under this test, the Court has found violations of the Confrontation Clause when
prosecutors relied on hearsay documents such as certified lab reports having the
purpose of showing that the defendants blood-alcohol level exceeded the legal
limit96 and certified lab reports having the purpose of showing that the substance
connected to a defendant contained cocaine.97
The police reports that are introduced against noncitizens in immigration court
certainly fit these two characteristics. They are out-of-immigration-court statements
93 Id. at 40, 68. The Court later held that a statement in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances indicating that the primary purpose was to enable police to meet an
ongoing emergency is not testimonial under Crawfords definition. Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Thus, a police interrogation that took place in the course of a 911
call did not produce testimonial statements and therefore was admissible notwithstanding
the lack of cross-examination of the 911 caller. Id. at 82829. In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.
Ct. 1143 (2011), the Court found that statements made to the police by a dying victim of a
gunshot wound were not testimonial because the circumstances of the encounter and the
statements and actions of the police and victim objectively indicate[d] that the primary
purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency. Id. at 116667 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). The Courts focus after Crawford
about which statements were testimonial has created, in the opinion of Jeffrey Bellin, a
dramatic curtailment of the post-Crawford confrontation right. Bellin, supra note 88, at
1868 (discussing the Courts decisions in Michigan v. Bryant and Davis v. Washington).
94 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citingReynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 15859 (1879)).
95 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012).
96 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
97 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307, 329 (2009). In Williams, the
Court applied this test to hold that a DNA report of the semen from the vaginal swabs of a rape
victim was not testimonial because it was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing
a targeted individual, but to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large. Williams, 132 S. Ct.
at 2243.
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that have the primary purpose of accusing the noncitizen of engaging in criminal
conduct. They are formalized statements such as affidavits.98 Why, then, are they rou-
tinely admitted and relied upon by immigration judges? The next section discusses
this question.
III. HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Immigration proceedings are civil, not criminal; thus, the full constitutional
protections of a criminal trial do not attach.99 Courts deciding immigration cases and
the Board repeatedly have held that neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause apply.100 The Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) gives noncitizens in removal proceedings a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the aliens own behalf,
and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.101 The INA allows
noncitizens to subpoena witnesses, although, unlike criminal proceedings, there is
no compulsory process right that guarantees the appearance of those witnesses.102 In
deportation cases, the noncitizen also has the right to have the government prove its
case by clear and convincing evidence (with the government bearing the burden
of proof).103 Beyond these statutory rights, there is one constitutional protection
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendmentthat applies. Due process requires
that immigration proceedings be fundamentally fair.104
A. Hearsays Treatment in Immigration Law
Courts have held that hearsay evidence is admissible in immigration pro-
ceedings if it is probative and its use is fundamentally fair.105 Courts also have
reasoned that fairness is closely related to the reliability and trustworthiness of the
98 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242.
99 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (holding that
deportation is not punishment).
100 See, e.g., Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Wadud, 19
I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (B.I.A. 1984); In re DeVera, 16 I. & N. Dec. 266, 268 (B.I.A. 1977);
see also Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2001) (Since deportation is civil, the
Confrontation Clause does not apply.).
101 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012).
102 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (The immigration judge may issue subpoenas . . . .
(emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI ([T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . (emphasis added)).
103 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
104 See Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2013); Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d
112, 115 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990).
105 See cases cited supra note 104.
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evidence.106 To determine whether evidence introduced in immigration court is
reliable and trustworthy, courts and the Board have used the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which, in codifying many of the firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay
doctrine, provide an easy test for reliability.
For example, in a line of cases, the government sought to produce an affidavit
signed by an ex-spouse, a U.S. citizen, whose written testimony proved that the
noncitizen committed marriage fraud. The courts discussed a right to confrontation
and cross-examination, rooted in either the statutory right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses107 or the Due Process Clause.108 In all of these cases, the courts held that
when the government introduces a hearsay document in immigration proceedings,
it must make reasonable efforts to ensure the presence of the witness.109 This rule
stems from a 1977 Board case,110 in which the Board reasoned that the U.S. citizen
spouse was writing the hearsay declaration against her own penal interest, and thus
it was reliable, as it would be admissible under FRE 804(b)(3).111 If the government
could prove they tried to find her but could not, that made her unavailable under
FRE 804(a)(5).112 Courts generally have held that the burden is on the government,
not the noncitizen, to make efforts to produce the witness.113
106 Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Felzcerek, 75 F.3d at
115); see also Duad v. United States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that despite
flexibility of evidentiary rules in removal proceedings, evidence must, in the final analysis,
be reliable).
107 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
108 See, e.g., Malave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that an immigration
judges rejection of the noncitizens subpoena request denied statutory right to cross-examine
the ex-husband whose affidavit proved marriage fraud and declining to reach the due process
challenge); Ocasio v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 105, 10708 (1st Cir. 2004) (reasoning that due pro-
cess requires the government to make reasonable efforts to secure the ex-husband whose
written testimonyproved marriage fraud, yet because the noncitizen did not object, she forfeited
any objection); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 123436 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that ex-
wifes affidavit proving marriage fraud was not admissible based on principles of fundamental
fairness when the government did not make reasonable efforts to secure her presence); Dallo
v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding that the government did make a reasonable
effort to subpoena the witness); Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the governments introduction of ex-wifes affidavit deprived noncitizen of his statutory and
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him).
109 See cases cited supra note 108; see also Pouhova, 726 F.3d at 1015 (questioning, in dicta,
the reasonable efforts theory, and stating, We do not see why making an unsuccessful
effort to locate a witness renders the unreliable hearsay evidence any more reliable or its use
any fairer than without such effort).
110 In re DeVera, 16 I. & N. Dec. 266, 26971 (B.I.A. 1977).
111 See id. at 270 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
112 See id. (defining an unavailable witness as a witness absent from the hearing where
the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure his attendance or testimony by
process or other reasonable means (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5))).
113 See Olabanji, 973 F.2d at 1236 (placing burden with INS when it produces the hearsay
document and discussing difficulty for pro se respondents without language skills or experience
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Several courts have considered due process challenges to an immigration judges
reliance on the form I-213, Record of Inadmissible/Deportable Alien.114 This form,
which is a recording of an immigration officers encounter with the noncitizen, can
be likened to the police report of removal proceedings because the information in
the I-213 usually forms the basis for issuing the charging document in immigration
court.115 The government, when seeking to meet its burden of showing alienage,116
frequently provides the I-213 to prove that the noncitizen told an immigration
officer of his foreign birth. Courts have held that the form I-213 is inherently
trustworthy; some have discussed its trustworthiness by concluding that it is a public
record.117 Thus, the burden is on the noncitizen to produce[ ] probative evidence
that contradicts anything material on the I-213 [that] would cast doubt upon its reli-
ability.118 If the noncitizen proves the I-213 to be untrustworthy, courts have found
it to be a violation of due process for the immigration judge to rely on it.119
In another example of the due process fundamental fairness test, courts have con-
sidered the admissibility of hearsay documents admitted against asylum-seekers.120
In these cases, the government sent asylum-seekers corroborating evidence to the
in the American conflict resolution system); Saidane v. INS, 129 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir.
1997) ([W]e require that the government must make a reasonable effort in INS proceedings
to afford the alien a reasonable opportunity to confront the witnesses against him or her.
This duty is not satisfied where the government . . . effectively . . . shift[s] the burden of
producing its witness onto [the alien.] (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988))).
114 See, e.g., Pouhova, 726 F.3d at 101216; Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056
(5th Cir. 1990); Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1975).
115 See STEEL, supra note 72 at § 14:1819.
116 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2014).
117 See, e.g., Barradas v. Holder, 582 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2009); Espinoza v. INS, 45
F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995); Bustos-Torres, 898 F.2d at 1056; Trias-Hernandez, 528 F.2d
at 369.
118 Espinoza, 45 F.3d at 311; see also id. at 310 (The burden of establishing a basis for
exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who
must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.
(citing Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1992))); In re Ponce-
Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784, 785 (B.I.A. 1999) (holding that, absent any indication that
a I-213 form contains information that is manifestly incorrect or was obtained by duress, the
form is inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence).
119 See, e.g., Pouhova, 726 F.3d at 101213, 1016; see also id. at 1013 (listing reasons
why I-213 may be unreliable: if it contains information known to be incorrect, was drafted
carelessly or maliciously, mischaracterizes material information, was obtained by coercion
or duress, or the information was obtained by someone other than the noncitizen who is the
subject of the form).
120 See, e.g., Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2013); Banat v. Holder, 557 F.3d
886 (8th Cir. 2009); Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2008); Lin v. U.S. Dept of
Justice, 459 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2006); Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2006);
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2003).
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U.S. Department of State in the country of persecution for the purposes of authenti-
cation and then sought to produce the hearsay State Department reports to prove the
documents were fake. While this report would be trustworthyas a public record, several
litigants successfully argued that reliance on an untrustworthy consular report vio-
lated an asylum-seekers due process rights;121 one reached the same conclusion on
statutory grounds.122 In these cases, courts remanded the cases back to the agency to
consider the asylum applications without the damaging hearsay documents. A recent
decision by the Ninth Circuit, however, harshly criticized these cases, stating, This
is just the opening chapter in what could well become the constitutionalization of
vast areas of administrative law.123
Thus, courts have found hearsay documents unreliable under the due process
fundamental fairness test and granted confrontation rights in immigration cases. This
trend, however, seems to stop short when the hearsay document in question is a
police report, especially when the case involves discretionary relief.
B. Police Reports in Discretionary Cases
The Boards 1988 decision in In re Grijalva124 is key to understanding how im-
migration judges rely on police reports in discretionary cases. In Grijalva, a lawful
permanent resident was deportable for having been convicted of a drug crime, yet
sought a waiver of deportation that only applied to convictions involving thirty grams
or less of marijuana.125 Over his objection, the government submitted a police report
121 See Banat, 557 F.3d at 89293; Anim, 535 F.3d at 25658; Alexandrov, 442 F.3d at
407; Ezeagwuna, 325 F.3d at 40608. But see Angov, 736 F.3d at 127280.
122 See Lin, 459 F.3d at 269 n.9 (reasoning that because the consular report was unreliable,
the agency decision that relied on it was not based on substantial evidence).
123 Angov, 736 F.3d at 1272. The Ninth Circuit in Angov found no due process violation
when the immigration judge relied on a State Department report demonstrating that the
asylum-seekers documents were fake. See id. at 1274. This was because (1) an asylum-
seeker has, as an applicant for admission, limited due process rights, id. at 127274 (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33435 (1976); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)); (2) the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in
administrative proceedings, see id. at 1275 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
40002 (1971)); (3) the court should attribute a presumption of regularity to the functioning
of the Department of State, see id. at 1276; and (4) asylum applicants themselves always rely
on hearsay to prove their cases, see id. at 1279. The Court stated, The balance struck by the
other circuits is so one-sided and unfair that it hobbles the governments ability to detect and
combat fraud in the asylum application process. Id. at 1280.
124 19 I. & N. Dec. 713 (B.I.A. 1988).
125 Id. at 71415. He applied for a waiver under former section 241(f)(2) of the INA,
which provided a discretionary waiver for noncitizens deportable for a drug crime that
related to simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana who had certain permanent
resident or U.S. citizen family members. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)(2) (1982)).
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that conflicted with his testimony in immigration court about the drug arrest.126 After
stating that the formal rules of evidence do not apply, the Board decided that the re-
port was probative and that Mr. Grijalva had not explained why its use was funda-
mentally unfair.127 Instead of fundamental fairness turning on the reliability of the
police report, the Board suggested that the fundamental fairness test only would be
satisfied if the police had coerced statements from him or had committed an egregious
Fourth Amendment violation in his arrest.128 The Board applied a regulation permit-
ting the admission of prior statements made by the respondent in any investigation129
(presumably reasoning that the police investigation was a prior investigation under
this regulation).130 Although the prior statements Mr. Grijalva made to the police
would have been admissible under this regulation, the Board went further to find that
Mr. Grijalvas testimony contradicted what the police report stated was found at the
scene (he said it was a small amount of marijuana; the police reported that scales and
baggies also were found).131 The Board held that Mr. Grijalva had not proven eligi-
bility for the relief he sought because of the discrepancies between the police report
and his testimony in immigration court.132
The Grijalva decision is troubling because the noncitizen was denied the op-
portunity to apply for relief due to a police officers written account that scales and
baggies were found at his house. Mr. Grijalva disputed this version of events and
properly objected to the hearsay evidence, yet the Board denied him an opportunity
to test the evidence through cross-examination. Moreover, the Board appeared to
ignore its prior test that based the fundamental fairness of a hearsay document on
whether it was reliable,133 and suggested it is only fundamentally unfair to admit police
reports if there was some gross misconduct by the police officer.134 To further pre-
vent any attempts to question police reports, in dicta, the Board stated, [T]he admis-
sion into the record of the information contained in the police reports is especially
126 Id. at 721. The discrepancies included both the alleged statements Mr. Grijalva made
to the police at the time of arrest and the evidence police found at his house. Id. at 724.
127 Id. at 722.
128 Id. (The respondent does not claim, for example, that he made statements involun-
tarily to the officers who arrested him, or that the police officers acted egregiously in seizing
evidence at his house. (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 105051 (1984); In
re Toro, 17 I & N Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980))).
129 The regulation at issue was 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c): The special inquiry officer may
receive in evidence any oral or written statement which is material and relevant to any issue
in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any investigation,
examination, hearing, or trial. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1997); see also Grijalva, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 722.
130 See Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 722.
131 Id. at 724.
132 Id.
133 See In re DeVera, 16 I. & N. Dec. 266, 26971 (B.I.A. 1977).
134 Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 722.
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appropriate in cases involving discretionary relief from deportation, where all rele-
vant factors concerning an arrest and conviction should be considered to determine
whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion.135
Contrast Grijalva with the 1995 Board case, In re Arreguin de Rodriguez.136 Ms.
Arreguin, a lawful permanent resident, was deportable due to a drug trafficking
conviction and applied for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former
section 212(c) of the INA.137 The Immigration Judge denied her application for
several reasons, one of which was the adverse factor of her arrest on suspicion of
alien smuggling (although Ms. Arreguin denied any wrongdoing and the arrest
report indicated that prosecution was declined).138 The Board reversed, finding that
she merited a favorable exercise of discretion.139 With respect to the arrest report for
alien smuggling, the Board reasoned, [W]e are hesitant to give substantial weight
to an arrest report, absent a conviction or corroborating evidence of the allegations
contained therein . . . . Considering that prosecution was declined and that there is
no corroboration, from the applicant or otherwise, we give the apprehension report
little weight.140 In Arreguin, it appears that the Board at least implicitly acknowl-
edged the reliability concerns when it decided to give little weight to police reports
that are not corroborated by other evidence.141 The Board did not, however, reject
the admission into evidence of such reports.
Courts of appeals reviewing discretionary immigration decisions generally have
followed Grijalvas reasoning that police reports are entirely admissible when deter-
mining discretionary relief. Multiple courts of appeals have held that in discretionary
decisions, the agency could rely on the contents of police reports, even absent a con-
viction and even if the noncitizen disputed the facts in the police reports.142 In these
135 Id.; see also In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (B.I.A. 1996) (reasoning, in dicta,
that a police report may be helpful in answering [whether the respondent merits a favorable
exercise of discretion] because it bears on the issue of the respondents conduct when he was
arrested, and this in turn is germane to whether the respondent merits discretionary relief
from deportation); cf. In re Thomas, 21 I. & N. Dec. 20, 2425 (B.I.A. 1995) (reasoning that
although a conviction was not final because it was on direct appeal, it could be considered
as a negative factor in a discretionary application for voluntary departure).
136 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1995).
137 Id. at 3839.
138 Id. at 42.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See Garces v. U.S. Atty Gen., 611 F.3d 1337, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing
Arreguin in holding that unreliable police reports without corroboration were insufficient
evidence to prove the noncitizen was removable).
142 See, e.g., Carcamo v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing In
re Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 713, 722 (B.I.A. 1998)) ([P]olice reports and complaints, even
if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately
admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.); Henry v.
INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) ([W]hile an arrest, without more, is simply an unproven
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cases, however, it was rarely just the allegations in the police reports that formed the
basis of a denial of relief.143 Dicta from the Ninth Circuit144 and the Fifth Circuit145
suggests that police reports, when no conviction resulted, should not be given any
serious weight in immigration court. A few courts have followed Arreguins skepti-
cism about relying on uncorroborated police reports in discretionary cases.146 For
example, in Avila-Ramirez v. Holder,147 the Seventh Circuit recently held that it was
error for an immigration judge to consider an arrest report that did not result in a
conviction in order to deny discretionary relief.148 The court chastised the judge and
Board for failing to follow Arreguin, a binding agency decision.149 No court, however,
charge, the fact of an arrest, and its attendant circumstances, often have probative value in
immigration proceedings.); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.
1994) (The fact of an arrest, insofar as it bears upon whether an alien might have engaged
in underlying conduct and insofar as facts probative of an aliens bad character or undesir-
ability as a permanent resident arise from the arrest itself, plainly can have relevance in per-
forming the analysis required by section 212(c).); Parcham v. INS, 769 F.2d 1001, 1005
(4th Cir. 1985) (Evidence of an aliens conduct, without a conviction, may be considered
in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.); cf. Esposito v. INS, 936 F.2d 911,
913, 91516 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that the Board properly denied a discretionary waiver
of inadmissibility when adverse factors included both pending murder charges and in absentia
Italian convictions for criminal associations, forgery, and unlawful possession of firearms).
But cf. In re Sotelo-Sotelo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 201, 205 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding, in a cancellation of
removal discretionary case, that the judge should not consider as an adverse factor an arrest
warrant for murder in Mexico where there was no conviction). The First Circuit distinguished
Arreguin by stating that Arreguin implicates matters of degree and that [n]othing in the
opinion suggests that, when facing a closer balance of equities, the Board might not properly
decide that a record of arrest tips the scales against the bestowal of discretionary relief.
Henry, 74 F.3d at 6.
143 See, e.g., Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 951 (10th Cir. 2005) (reasoning in a
discretionary adjustment and waiver application that the Boards decision was based on all
of petitioners criminal conduct, not only or even primarily on the unlawful contact that had
not resulted in a criminal conviction).
144 See Paredes-Urrestarazu, 36 F.3d at 816 (Although we would be troubled if this were
a case in which the Board found the mere fact of arrest probative of whether Petitioner had
engaged in underlying conduct, here, the Board had before it much more. (footnote omitted)).
145 See Sierra-Reyes v. INS, 585 F.2d 762, 764 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the
immigration judge should not have considered as adverse factors in a 212(c) case two police
reports where the prosecution determined there was insufficient evidence to prosecute, but
deciding that reversal of a denial was not warranted because other evidence revealed a
rather lengthy, involved and complicated involvement with law).
146 See, e.g., Avila-Ramirez v. Holder, 764 F.3d 717, 725 (7th Cir. 2014); Billeke-Tolosa
v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 708, 71213 (6th Cir. 2004).
147 764 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2014).
148 Id. at 725.
149 See id.; see also Billeke-Tolosa, 385 F.3d at 71213 (reasoning that because of the
Boards precedential decision in Arreguin, it was impermissible for an immigration judge to
deny discretionary relief based on charges for sexual misconduct when the charges had been
amended to simple assault and disorderly conduct).
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has held that an immigration judge impermissibly admitted a police report in a dis-
cretionary case; at most, courts have instructed immigration judges to give an un-
corroborated police report no weight in its discretionary decision.150
C. Police Reports in Non-Discretionary Decisions
When police reports are used outside of the discretionary context in immigration
law, courts may be more willing to question their reliability. In Garces v. United
States Attorney General,151 the Eleventh Circuit refused to uphold a finding of
inadmissibility based on reason to believe a noncitizen was a controlled substance
trafficker.152 The noncitizen previously had pled guilty to distributing cocaine, al-
though it was unclear whether he admitted actual guilt.153 Later, his conviction was
vacated, leaving only the police report to form the basis of the governments charged
ground of inadmissibility.154 The court acknowledged that police reports would be
impermissible in a criminal case pursuant to FRE 803(8), yet reasoned that they
were not barred from being considered in an administrative immigration proceed-
ing.155 Turning to the police reports, the court determined that they only stated the
officers conclusions as opposed to observing any facts sufficient to show guilt, and
thus, the arrest reports by themselves do not offer reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence that there is reason to believe Garces engaged in drug trafficking.156
While the court in Garces questioned the reliability of one particular police
report, Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit, in a concurring opinion, suggested a
more blanket rejection of using police reports to prove removability.157 The majority
opinion in Olivas-Motta v. Holder158 refused deference to the Attorney Generals
150 The Second Circuit, in dicta, recognized this discrepancy in the Boards treatment of
police reports and called on the Board to either distinguish or overturn its precedents in
Arreguin and Sotelo-Sotelo. See Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 6970 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citing In re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 42 (B.I.A. 1995); In re Sotelo-
Sotelo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 201, 205 (B.I.A. 2001)).
151 611 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2010).
152 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) (2012).
153 See Garces, 611 F.3d at 1348 (stating that it is not clear whether he admitted his guilt
or entered a plea of convenience that the state adopted pursuant to North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).
154 Id. at 134041.
155 Id. at 1349.
156 Id. at 134950; see also id. at 1346 (stating that the reason to believe ground of
inadmissibility must be based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence and
factual determinations must be supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
on the record considered as a whole (citing In re Rico, 16 I. & N. Dec. 181, 185 (B.I.A.
1977); Diallo v. U.S. Atty Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010))).
157 See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 91819 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring).
158 746 F.3d 907 (majority opinion).
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decision in In re Silva-Trevino159 (which, rejecting the categorical approach, per-
mitted judges to look at any evidence when determining whether certain convictions
involved moral turpitude).160 The majority rejected any fact-finding on the issue of
whether a crime involved moral turpitude, holding that Congress clearly intended
immigration judges to use the categorical approach.161 Judge Kleinfeld, however,
saw that the real problem stemmed from the immigration judges reliance on a police
report, which he stated was not reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
that a noncitizen was deportable and did not satisfy the clear and convincing
evidence standard.162 In stating that police reports are not especially useful instru-
ments for finding out what persons charged actually did,163 Judge Kleinfeld appears
to follow the reasoning of other circuit courts that have rejected the reliability of
police reports when they are used to establish facts in other civil contexts.164
D. The Categorical Approach: The Canary in the Coal Mine
The strict categorical approach, which immigration judges historically have used
to determine whether noncitizens are removable for criminal convictions,165 has
prevented judges from relying on police reports to make legal determinations about
159 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Atty Gen. 2008).
160 Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 91617.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 918 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)).
163 Id. at 919 & n.17 ([P]olice reports . . . often contain little more than unsworn witness
statements and initial impressions. . . . Further, because the[y] are generated early in an in-
vestigation, they do not account for later events, such as witness recantations, amendments,
or corrections. (alterations in original) (quoting Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 48384
(4th Cir. 2012))).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding due
process violation when police report was not subject to cross-examination at a parole revoca-
tion hearing and stating, While police reports may be demonstrably reliable evidence of
the fact that an arrest was made they are significantly less reliable evidence of whether the
allegations of criminal conduct they contain are true. (quoting United States v. Bell, 785
F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986))); Bell, 785 F.2d at 64344 (finding in a probation revocation
hearing that urinalysis laboratory reports bear substantial indicia of reliability, but reasoning
that police reports are not as inherently reliable because [t]he relationship between police
officers and those whom they arrest is much more personal and adversarial in nature than that
between chemists and those whose urine they test); see also Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d
123, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (We join the other circuits in expressing concern about the
reliance in parole revocation hearings on hearsay in police reports . . . .). But see id. at
13031 (finding that the police report in the instant case bore indicia of reliability because
it was quite detailed, portions were corroborated by the parolees testimony, and the report
contained internal corroboration of the complainants version of events).
165 See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Cate-
gorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (discussing the history
of the categorical approach).
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removability.166 The police report problem was largely wrapped up in discretionary,
not legal, decisions. Many of the discretionary decisions never received serious review
by the courts, for reasons detailed below.167 However, courts and the Board have cre-
ated several exceptions to the categorical approach in recent years.168 With the dawn
of more fact-finding on removability, courts increasingly were asked to decide whether
facts as presented in a police report could be clear and convincing evidence of re-
movability.169 This led circuit courts to critique immigration judges reliance on
police reports to establish facts in removal cases.170 This Article proposes that the
exposure of the police report problem to reviewing courts by stripping away the cate-
gorical approach is the factor that may cause the demise of the police report problem.
First, it is necessary to let us look at why the police report problem can be ig-
nored by circuit courts when it arises in a discretionary decision. In some cases, the
reliance on untrustworthy police reports essentially amounted to harmless error,
since other negative factors existed to deny discretionary relief or the noncitizen
himself admitted to several facts of the police report.171 The fact pattern of a non-
citizen admitting to wrongdoing, yet expressing remorse, is common and perhaps
strategically wise when a noncitizen is begging for mercy, as he is when he asks for
a discretionary waiver.172 Yet such concessions of guilt by the noncitizen relieve im-
migration judges and reviewing courts of the need to determine whether the police
report is reliable.
In other cases, important legal questions got swallowed up in a discretionary
decision. This is because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of most
166 See supra notes 2534.
167 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).
168 See supra notes 3134.
169 See, e.g., Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 91719 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 48384 (4th Cir. 2012).
170 See, e.g., Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 91719 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); Prudencio, 669
F.3d at 48384.
171 See Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (Although we
would be troubled if this were a case in which the Board found the mere fact of arrest pro-
bative of whether Petitioner had engaged in underlying conduct, here, the Board had before
it much more. (footnote omitted)); Sierra-Reyes v. INS, 585 F.2d 762, 764 n.3 (5th Cir.
1978) (reasoning that the immigration judge should not have considered as adverse factors
in a 212(c) case two police reports where the prosecution determined there was insufficient
evidence to prosecute, but deciding that reversal of a denial was not warranted because other
evidence revealed a rather lengthy, involved and complicated involvement with law (cita-
tion omitted)).
172 See Abira Ashfaq, We Have Given Them this Power: Reflections of an Immigration
Attorney, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2004, at 66, 71 (describing one attorneys counseling of
her client who was asking for immigration discretionary relief and saying that her client knew
what the judges wanted to hear. . . . They know judges want them to accept responsibility,
express remorse, say they are guilty and sorry, ashamed and reformed . . . and grovel for
release. This is the story they want to hear and nothing else).
2015] CONFRONTING COPS IN IMMIGRATION COURT 703
discretionary decisions, including decisions on cancellation of removal, waivers of
inadmissibility, voluntary departure, and adjustment of statusthe vast majority of
discretionary decisions in which police reports play a critical role.173 While issues
such as whether a judge may properly rely on hearsay evidence or whether a non-
citizen has a right to confront his accuser are legal questions that are reviewable under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D),174 in some cases courts have refused to decide these impor-
tant legal questions because they arose in the context of a discretionary decision. In
one example, the Second Circuit in Carcamo v. U.S. Department of Justice175 reasoned
that talismanic invocation of the language of due process is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on this Court176 because [d]ue process does not require that the [immi-
gration judge] credit Carcamos testimony over the evidence contained in the criminal
complaint.177 The Carcamo decision is a good example of Daniel Kanstrooms
173 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). Also precluded is judicial review of any other
decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security, other than asylum decisions. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
174 See, e.g., Solis v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that a due
process claim that a police report should be inadmissible because it is hearsay and the non-
citizen disputes its contents is a legal issue that the court can consider pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D)).
175 498 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007).
176 Id. at 98 (quoting Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2d
Cir. 2006)).
177 Id. In an older case that preceded 8 U.S.C. § 1252, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956),
a noncitizen was denied the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation based on secret
evidence. In Jay, the petitioner was deportable for being a member of the Communist Party;
he applied for suspension of removal under former 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), which was a dis-
cretionary form of relief. 351 U.S. at 34749. The special inquiry officer found that he met
the statutory prerequisites for the relief but that the petitioner did not warrant favorable
action in view of certain confidential information; the Board of Immigration Appeals
upheld this determination. Id. at 34950. The petitioner challenged a regulation that provided
for the use of confidential information in ruling upon suspension applications if disclosure
of the information would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety or security. Id. at 352.
The Court held that the use of confidential information in a suspension hearing was properly
within the exercise of the agencys discretion; the Court reasoned, In view of the gratuitous
nature of the relief, the use of confidential information in a suspension proceeding is . . .
clearly within statutory authority . . . . Id. at 359, 361. Although the Jay Court was not
considering a constitutional challenge to the statute at issue, the Court stated that the con-
stitutionality of [the statutory section] as herein interpreted gives us no difficulty. Id. at 357
n.21; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L.REV. 703,75159 (1997) (focusing on Jay and
discussing the role of discretion in immigration law). In a more recent decision, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a similar regulation in immigration law that permitted a denial of discretionary
relief based on material that was confidential. Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.
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observation that [d]iscretion will be a dustbin of a jurisprudential category: the place
whereas triples were once said to do in the glove of Joe Jacksoncomplicated legal
questions go to die.178
It is next important to show how the categorical approach has masked the police
report problem. Since the 1900s, with the advent of what is now called the cate-
gorical approach, courts have avoided the facts of a conviction when determining
immigration consequences, holding that this analysis was elements-based.179 In the
early days of this elements-based approach, courts were determining whether a non-
citizens conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude, as this is one of the
earliest criminal grounds of inadmissibility and deportability.180 Julia Simon-Kerr
hypothesizes that courts, when faced with the difficult and value-laden judgement
on whether someones acts involved moral turpitude, created this approach to avoid
moral assessments by removing much of the factual material upon which an evalua-
tion of an individuals character could be made.181 Courts thus preferred the categorical
approach as a mechanical rule that avoided moral assessments of an individual.182
Against the backdrop of this long history of avoiding facts of a conviction, the
Board held that police reports were specifically excluded when judges employed the
categorical approach.183 The police report, where all of the most damaging facts about
an individuals crime tend to be, could not be considered under this approach.184
Unsurprisingly, courts and the Agency were frustrated with the blinders that the
categorical approach put on them.185 Thus developed a body of case law with
1985) (holding that the application of 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a), (c) (1984), a regulation that per-
mitted consideration of non-record material evidence that is not disclosed to the petitioner,
did not violate due process). There, the court, citing Jay, stated that although [a]s a matter
of fairness and logic, the [due process] argument has considerable appeal, . . . it is foreclosed
by authority. Id. (citing Jay, 351 U.S. at 357 n.21, 36061).
178 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 240 (2007).
179 See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914). See generally
Das, supra note 165 (discussing the history of the categorical approach); Rebecca Sharpless,
Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration
Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 97980 (2008).
180 See Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 64951 (2012).
181 Julia Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1056 (2012).
182 Id.
183 See In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (B.I.A. 1996).
184 See id.
185 See, e.g., Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (The push in the
law toward categorical approaches to classifying crimes as either involving moral turpitude
or not is largely based on the policy of not retrying prior criminal convictions in later depor-
tation hearings. No such interest is served by precluding consideration of basic facts stated on
the official court records of the charging and conviction documents. The categorical approach
does not require that blinders be worn.); In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 695 (Atty
Gen. 2008) (I cannot believe that Congress intended for [persons who have actually com-
mitted crimes involving moral turpitude] to be allowed to remain simply because there might
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exceptions to the strict categorical approach.186 Scholars critiqued this caselaw, arguing
for the preservation of the categorical approach because of fairness,187 historical
consistency,188 uniformity,189 consistency with Congressional intent,190 and adminis-
trative efficiency.191 Until 2013, when the Supreme Court issued a set of decisions
affirming a very strict categorical approach,192 one might have wondered whether
the categorical approach would continue to exist in immigration law.
This Article does not attempt to address the normative questions surrounding the
categorical approach. It proposes, however, a perhaps unintended consequence of
stripping away the categorical approach: exposing the police report problem to circuit
courts. A good example of this phenomenon is the circuit courts treatment of the
Attorney Generals 2008 Silva-Trevino decision. In Silva-Trevino, Attorney General
Mukasey permitted immigration judges to use a factual inquiry to decide whether
many offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude.193 Several courts have rejected
the holding in Silva-Trevino because the statutory ground of deportability requires
a conviction, which evinces a Congressional intent to use the categorical approach,
not a factual inquiry.194 In one decision, Prudencio v. Holder,195 the Fourth Circuit
went further to address the very real evidentiary concerns that Silva-Trevinos
factual inquiry allows.196 These concerns include allow[ing] immigration judges to
rely on documents of questionable veracity as proof of an aliens conduct. These
documents, such as police reports and warrant applications, often contain little more
have been no moral turpitude in the commission by other individuals (real or hypothetical)
of crimes described by the wording of the same statute under an identical indictment. (quoting
Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1027 (1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting))).
186 See supra notes 3134.
187 See Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical
Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J.
257 (2012).
188 See Das, supra note 165.
189 See Sharpless, supra note 179.
190 See id.
191 See, e.g., Das, supra note 165; Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing
Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241 (2011); Koh, supra note 187; Sharpless, supra
note 179. But see Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor's Categorical Approach: Applying
Legal Imagination to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO.MASON L.REV. 625, 662 (2011) (discuss-
ing how the realistic probability test of the categorical approach has made the categorical
approach more difficult, and thus less efficient, to administer).
192 See supra note 34 (describing the Courts decisions in Moncrieffe and Descamps).
193 In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Atty Gen. 2008).
194 See, e.g., Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 2014); Olivas-Motta v.
Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 91617 (9th Cir. 2013); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th
Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. U.S. Atty Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); Jean-Louis v.
Atty Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 482 (3d Cir. 2009).
195 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012).
196 Id. at 48384.
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than unsworn witness statements and initial impressions.197 Judge Kleinfeld, in the
Olivas-Motta case, repeatedly questioned the government during oral argument about
how a police report could be the basis of facts.198 In a concurring opinion, he dis-
agreed that the word conviction evinced a Congressional intent to use the categor-
ical approach,199 and made a larger issue out of the evidentiary concerns of relying
on police reports.200
There are other possible explanations of courts newfound critique of immigration
judges reliance on police reports. One could say that the outcome is different in
cases where the government bears the burden of proof, such as decisions on deporta-
bility,201 versus decisions such as eligibility for relief, eligibility for bond, and
discretionary decisions, where the noncitizen bears the burden of proof.202 In Garces,
however, the noncitizen bore the burden of proof since he had never been admitted
to the U.S.;203 there, the Eleventh Circuit refused to uphold a finding of inadmis-
sibility based on reason to believe a noncitizen was a controlled substance trafficker.204
One could also say that this is just a recent trend that federal courts are finally
critiquing immigration judges blind reliance on police reports to establish facts in
removal cases.205 However, this trend surely is influenced by other factorsand this
Article proposes that the main factor is the demise of the categorical approach. If so,
197 Id.
198 Oral Argument, Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011) (No. 10-
72459).
199 See Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 919 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (The majority places
more weight on the phrase convicted of than it can bear. The phrase could mean . . . that
we may look to conduct that an alien committed . . . the ambiguity of the phrase supports a
need for deference to the subsequent interpretation by the administrative agency.).
200 Id.
201 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (2012).
202 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4); In re Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (B.I.A. 2009).
203 See Garces v. U.S. Atty Gen., 611 F.3d 1337, 134546 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(2)(A)) (finding that a noncitizen who is applicant for admission must prove that
he is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the U.S. and not inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182). The court reasoned that the burden of proof in the immigration
hearing and the standard of review on appeal are not the same thing. Id. at 1346. Reasoning
that a finding of inadmissibility must be based on something more than the aliens failure
to prove a negative, the court refused to affirm the Boards decision because it was not
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. Id. at 1346, 1350.
204 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i).
205 See, e.g., Avila-Ramirez v. Holder, 764 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 2014) (criticizing the
B.I.A. for relying on uncorroborated arrest report in denying discretionary relief); Olivas-
Motta, 746 F.3d at 91819 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (criticizing judge for relying on police
report to sustain deportability finding for crime involving moral turpitude); Prudencio v.
Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 48384 (4th Cir. 2012) (criticizing In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 687, 690 (Atty Gen. 2008), for allowing immigration judges to rely on documents such
as police reports that are of questionable veracity as proof of an aliens conduct).
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as criminal grounds of deportability are decided less through the categorical approach
and more through findings of fact,206 there are likely to be more critiques of immi-
gration judges reliance on police reports.207 These critiques can easily spill over into
the use of police reports in the discretionary context, as in the recent Avila-Ramirez
decision where the Seventh Circuit criticized an immigration judge for relying on
an uncorroborated arrest report in denying discretionary relief.208
The categorical approach thus has become the canary in the coal mine: as long
as it lives, the police report problem can be ignored by reviewing courts. Once the
categorical approach was threatened with extinction, immigration courts blind
reliance on police reports was exposed to circuit courts, which were presented with
the clean legal issue of whether the facts as detailed in a police report could cause
the deportation of a noncitizen. Thus the whole system in immigration court of
building facts solely from police reports threatened to come crashing down.
IV. CONFRONTING COPS IN IMMIGRATION COURT
Given the untrustworthiness of police reports and immigration judges frequent
reliance on them, should there be a right to confront police officers in immigration
court? This section examines the right to confront police officers in immigration
court by conceptualizing removal proceedings in three different ways209: (1) de-
portation is punishment, and thus there should be a complete application of the Sixth
Amendments protections, including the Confrontation Clause; (2) deportation is civil,
and the case-by-case balancing test of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantees the right to confront and cross-examine cops; and (3) deportation
206 See supra Part I.A.
207 For example, the Attorney Generals 2008 decision in In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 687, permitted immigration judges to use a factual inquiry to decide whether many
offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude. Several courts have rejected the holding in
Silva-Trevino because the statutory ground of deportability requires a conviction, which
evinces a congressional intent to use the categorical approach, not a factual inquiry. See, e.g.,
Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 2014); Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916;
Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 484; Fajardo v. U.S. Atty Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir.
2011); Jean-Louis v. Atty Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 482 (3d Cir. 2009). In
rendering these decisions, some of the courts also discussed how the evidence the judge
relied on to support a finding of deportabilitya police reportwas unreliable. See, e.g.,
Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 91819 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 48384.
208 See Avila-Ramirez, 764 F.3d at 72325.
209 See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
67 (1984) (describing how the judicial assimilation into the deportation process of rights
drawn from criminal procedure can take several forms, including expanded notions of
fundamental fairness, classification of deportation as quasi-criminal, application of equal
protection standards, or general administrative law principles).
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is quasi-criminal and thus deserving of heightened protections, including the right
to confrontation.
A. Application of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in Immigration
Court (Deportation is Punishment)
Immigration law historically has been categorized as a civil proceeding, which
means the constitutional protections available to criminal defendants do not apply.210
Thus, immigration law has seen all procedural protections either guaranteed by
statute, or, to the extent they are imposed constitutionally, filtered through the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause211 where fundamental fairness dictates whether
a certain procedure is necessary. The fundamental fairness test has led to a water-
ing down of the protections available in a criminal case.212 Several scholars have
convincingly argued that deportationor at least deportation of lawful permanent
residentsis punishment, and therefore the procedural protections of a criminal trial
should apply.213 Of particular interest on this topic is the Supreme Courts 2010
holding in Padilla v. Kentucky.214
Padilla calls into question the categorization of deportation as civil, thus question-
ing whether the Sixth Amendment should apply to deportation proceedings.215 In
210 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dis-
senting) (reasoning that deportation is punishment).
211 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1895 (2000) (If nonciti-
zens should happen to have any of the rights accorded to criminal defendants, it is primarily
because of statutory or regulatory protections or because the courts have read such rights to
be implicit components of due process.).
212 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 2, at 160405 (discussing the limited Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections that apply in the immigration, as opposed to the criminal, context);
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 367, 393 (2006) (Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, prominent features of
criminal trials, do not apply in deportation proceedings except to the limited extent that
fundamental fairness requires them.).
213 See Bleichmar, supra note 2; Kanstroom, supra note 211; Stephen H. Legomsky, The
Alien Criminal Defendant: Sentencing Considerations, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105 (1977);
Legomsky, supra note 2; Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A
Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008) (exploring the tension between the firmly established
civil label and the contrary experience of people subject to removal proceedings); see also
Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 512 (2007) (The now prolific case
law dismissing deportation as civil rather than criminal or otherwise punitive is long on
citation of precedent and short on independent reasoning.).
214 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
215 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461
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Padilla, the Supreme Court ruled that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment
right to be counseled about the specific immigration consequences of their guilty
pleas.216 On its face, Padilla appears to be a simple holding about defense counsels
duty to advise noncitizen defendants about deportation consequences.217 To reach
that holding, however, the Court made significant headway into reclassifying depor-
tation as punishment. For example, the Court stated that deportation is an integral
partindeed, sometimes the most important partof the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes,218 after
discussing how [o]ur law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of
deportation for nearly a century,219 and it is most difficult to divorce the penalty
from the conviction in the deportation context.220 The Court seemed to waffle
between calling deportation civil or criminal. Repeating the time-honored passage
that deportation is not punishment for a crime, the Court then stated that deportation
is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process.221 The Court ultimately re-
fused to classify deportation as either civil or criminal. Conflating the civil-criminal
distinction with the collateral-direct designation, the Court stated that deportation is
uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence [of a
criminal conviction].222
The Court went very far in saying that the Sixth Amendment applies when
deportation is a certain consequence of a criminal conviction, all the while maintain-
ing the historical classification of deportation as civil.223 Perhaps the Court did not
go far enough; as Daniel Kanstroom has written, Padilla introduced a Fifth and a
Half Amendment, which embodies both the specific protections of the Sixth Amend-
ment and the flexibility of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.224 Kanstroom
(2011); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011)
(examining the evolution of the Supreme Courts jurisprudence regarding the quasi-
criminal nature of deportation proceedings).
216 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
217 See id. (It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal
defendantwhether a citizen or notis left to the mercies of incompetent counsel. To
satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation. (citation omitted) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970))).
218 Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
219 Id. at 36566.
220 Id. at 366 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. 1982)).
221 Id. at 365.
222 Id. at 366; see Markowitz, supra note 215, at 133739 (discussing how courts tend
to use the term collateral consequence as synonymous with civil consequence and that
the Padilla Court conflates these two discussions).
223 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (We have long recognized that deportation is a particu-
larly severe penalty, but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. (quoting Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893))).
224 See Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1475.
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and others argue, applying the Courts holding and reasoning in Padilla, that counsel
should be appointed in deportation proceedings.225 This is because the Courts opinion
cannot fully be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of deportation to the
realm of civil collateral consequences in which there is no clear constitutional right
to counsel.226
If Padillas logical extension is that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches in immigration court, noncitizens should benefit from other protections of
the Sixth Amendment in removal proceedings, namely, the Confrontation Clause.
Police reports such as those described in Part I are out-of-immigration-court state-
ments that have the primary purpose of accusing noncitizens of engaging in criminal
conduct; they also are formalized statements such as affidavits.227 These reports
certainly would be considered testimonial under Crawford and its progeny.228
Thus, if the Confrontation Clause applied in removal proceedings, no police report
could be admitted in immigration court without the right to confront and cross-
examine the police officer.
One can argue that this stretches the Padilla holding too far. Padilla was merely
a case about criminal defense counsels obligation to advise about immigration con-
sequences, and the Court said nothing about what evidence should be admitted in
immigration court.229 However, the Courts grounding of the issue in the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, as opposed to the Fifth Amendment voluntariness of the plea,
introduces some of the hard-floor protections of a criminal trial, such as the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, into deportation law.230 One of these hard-floor pro-
tections is the Confrontation Clause. If Padilla can be read to introduce the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel into deportation proceedings, other Sixth Amendment
hard-floor rights that guarantee the fairness of a trial should attach as well.231
225 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deporta-
tion Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305, 319 (2011);
Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 5557 (2011); Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135859.
226 Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1466.
227 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012); supra Part I.
228 See generally supra Part II.
229 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
230 See Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 148889; id. at 14971500 (discussing cases
leading up to Gideons recognition of a right to counsel in criminal cases and stating, It
would seem to be clearly wrong now to categorize all forms of deportation as noncriminal,
nonpunitive, and collateral, and thus subject only to flexible (and frequently ineffective) due
process norms à la Betts.); Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135253.
231 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68485 (1984) (The Constitution
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the
Counsel Clause . . . .).
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One may also ask: would applying the Confrontation Clause to removal pro-
ceedings solve the police report problem described in Part I? First, not all types of
removals may be easily conceptualized as punishment and therefore trigger Sixth
Amendment protections. As Kanstroom has described, deportation of noncitizens
like Mr. Padillathose who have been admitted to the U.S. who are deportable due
to criminal conductcan be labeled post-entry social control deportation.232 For
them, Kanstroom argues, deportation essentially functions as punishment because it
regulates their behavior and thus exercises continual control over them, as does the
criminal law.233 Thus, the constitutional protections of a criminal trial should apply
in these proceedings.234 This is not the case for extended border control types of
deportations, when the noncitizen has not been admitted to the U.S. or has been ad-
mitted but violates the rules that govern his temporary residence.235 These proceedings
are essentially contractual, and thus it is more appropriate to think of them as civil
and non-punitive.236 One can read the Padilla Courts Sixth Amendment holding as
limited to the facts of the case: Mr. Padilla was a lawful permanent resident deported
for a criminal conviction.237 If one were to relook at the Supreme Courts test for deter-
mining whether a civil sanction is punishment and thus deserving of all the crim-
inal protections,238 lawful permanent residents have the most to lose if deported.239
For others, though, such as noncitizens who were paroled into the United States for
humanitarian reasons and years later seek to be admitted to the United States, like the
Mariel Cubans,240 it is not so clear that their removal proceedings would be deemed
punishment, thus requiring Sixth Amendment Confrontation rights.
232 Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1465.
233 See Kanstroom, supra note 211, at 1898.
234 Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1465, 14991500.
235 Id. at 146566.
236 See Kanstroom, supra note 211, at 189798.
237 See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
238 See Maddali, supra note 225, at 3449 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 16869 (1963)) (considering post-Padilla whether deportation is punishment under
the Kennedy-Mendoza test for whether a given civil sanction is deemed punishment).
239 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122
YALE L.J. 2394, 240406 (2013); Markowitz, supra note 213, at 29192; see also Kanstroom,
supra note 216, at 1510 (arguing that refugees can benefit from the application of the Fifth-
and-a-Half Amendment due to the harshness of deportation as a sanction in their cases, the con-
vergence of these cases with the criminal system, and the difference that counsel can make).
240 In 1980, about 125,000 Cubans were part of the Freedom Flotilla, where Fidel Castro
allowed them to leave via the port of Mariel. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution
of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92
COLUM.L.REV. 1625, 1666 (1992). It was impossible for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to process all of them at once, so INS utilized the parole power to bring them
into the United States. Id. Many of the Marielitos were inadmissible because of criminal
records and were excluded. Id. Because Cuba refused to repatriate them, many of the
Marielitos remained in indefinite immigration detention, unsuccessfully making substantive
due process arguments against indefinite detention. Id. Their plight finally reached the
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Second, it is not clear that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause would
apply when immigration courts make decisions regarding relief from removal and
bond. In a criminal trial, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is a trial
right;241 thus, it does not apply at sentencing242 or in pre-trial matters such as bail
hearings.243 When comparing removal to criminal proceedings, discretionary
decisions on relief can be likened to sentencing because the judge already has found
the noncitizen removablethe guilty phaseand then decides a noncitizens fate
by balancing the good against the bad in his life.244 As described above, some of the
most problematic uses of police reports can be seen when immigration courts decide
discretionary relief.245 Similarly, bail hearings in criminal court can be likened to
bond hearings in immigration court.246 Because the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause does not apply to pre-trial hearings such as bail,247 that right would not
necessarily attach in the analogous hearing in immigration court. Thus, con-
ceptualizing deportation as punishment post-Padilla to extend Sixth Amendment
Confrontation rights in immigration court may only solve a small sliver of the police
report problem.
Supreme Court in 2005, where the Court decided, based on statutory interpretation grounds,
that they could not be indefinitely detained. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 38587
(2005). Because the Court made a statutory, instead of a due process, holding to release
them, Cold War era case law stating that noncitizens seeking entry had no due process rights
was not overruled. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 21315
(1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). The Garces
case, which is described supra Part III.C, is one example of a Mariel Cuban who, years after
he was paroled into the United States, sought to adjust status, yet the government argued,
presenting police reports, that he was inadmissible to the United States. Garces v. U.S. Atty
Gen., 611 F.3d 1337, 133941 (11th Cir. 2010).
241 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011) (As a rule, if an out-of-
court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial
unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior
opportunity to confront that witness. (emphasis added)).
242 See, e.g., United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 57576 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 24344 (2d Cir. 2005).
243 See United States v. Hernandez, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 122327 (D.N.M. 2011) (holding,
post-Crawford, that the right to confrontation does not apply at detention hearings and col-
lectingpre-Crawfordcases inwhichcourtsheld that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
did not apply to bail hearings); United States v. Bibbs, 488 F. Supp. 2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (Nothing in Crawford requires or even suggests that it be applied to a detention hearing
under the Bail Reform Act, which has never been considered to be part of the trial.).
244 See supra Part I.A.
245 See supra Part III.B.
246 IMMIGRATION COURT OBSERVATION PROJECT, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, FUNDA-
MENTALFAIRNESS:AREPORT ON THE DUE PROCESS CRISIS IN NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION
COURTS9 (Conor Gleason et al. eds., 2011), http://nycicop.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/icop
-report-5-10-2011.pdf.
247 See, e.g., Hernandez, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 122327; Bibbs, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 926.
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Finally, there are practical problems with importing the Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause into removal proceedings. As Anne Traum has observed,248 the
Fifth Amendment can provide greater protection,249 greater flexibility, and greater
speed in adoption of rights.250 In addition, importing Sixth Amendment procedures
into immigration proceedings might prove difficult because the Sixth Amendment
is offense-specific and only applies to felonies and misdemeanors involving a loss
of liberty.251 Traum argues that importing rights into deportation proceedings based
on the Fifth Amendment allows courts to innovate rights, borrowing from the Sixth
Amendment as needed, and retooling it to fit the immigration context when
necessary without fear of implication for the criminal context.252
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Balancing (Deportation is Civil)
Another framework through which to view the application of confrontation rights
in deportation proceedings is through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The signature component of due process is flexibility: as the Court has stated,
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures uni-
versally applicable to every imaginable situation.253 In Mathews v. Eldridge,254 the
248 See generally Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491 (2011) (arguing that while the Sixth Amendment may serve as an
important guidepost, courts should tailor procedural protections to the Due Process Clause).
249 She cites the example of discovery. In the criminal context, under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the prosecution must disclose material evidence which is favorable
to the accused; this allows the prosecutor to be the gatekeeper to decide which evidence to
disclose. See Traum, supra note 248, at 535. In comparison, in removal proceedings, non-
citizens must rely on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, limited discovery, and
their own investigation. Id. at 536. In immigration proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)
establishes that a noncitizen seeking admission must show he is lawfully present in the
United States pursuant to a prior admission, and in order to meet this burden of proof he shall
have access to his visa and all other entry documents (as long as they are not deemed
confidential by the Attorney General) pertaining to his admission. In the case of Dent v.
Holder, 627 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit read this access statute broadly and,
citing due process concerns, required the government to produce documents that would prove
he had a derivative citizenship claim. 627 F.3d at 37374. Traum cites this comparison of
the discovery rights in immigration and criminal court as an example of how criminal pro-
cedures can be more limited, since unlike criminal discovery, the government in a case like
Dent is not tasked with identifying which evidence is favorable or whether it is material; the
government must hand over the entire file. Traum, supra note 248, at 541.
250 This is because it builds on a framework that the Supreme Court has already estab-
lished. Traum, supra note 248, at 534.
251 Id. at 53334. But see Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideons Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2301
(2013) (arguing that following Padilla, the Sixth Amendment should require appointment
of counsel for the fine-only crimes that will result in deportation).
252 Traum, supra note 248, at 534.
253 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
254 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause requires any particular procedure in a civil case before the govern-
ment can take away a statutorily created right.255 Courts must consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Governments interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.256
The Mathews test has been the preferred means by which courts and scholars
alike have examined whether procedural protections should be provided in immi-
gration court.257
There is ample precedent for finding that due process requires the right to con-
frontation and cross-examination in civil cases.258 For example, in the 1963 case
255 The Court held that the claimant in the case had a property right to Social Security
disability benefits. This right, which was created by statute, created a property interest that
could not be taken away without due process of law. Id. at 33233, 335.
256 Id. at 335.
257 See, e.g., Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 32122 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying the Mathews
balancing test to determine if videoconferencing violates due process rights in removal
proceedings); see also Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135153 (analyzing the civil Mathews
test and the hard floor criminal model to evaluate whether certain procedures should apply
in deportation proceedings).
258 In many civil cases finding confrontation rights, the Court has relied on dicta from a
1959 case, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), where the petitioner was discharged
from his employment in a company that provided products to the government; this discharge
was a direct result of the government revoking his security clearance due to ex parte evidence
about his alleged ties to the Communist Party. 360 U.S. at 47579. Although the Court in
Greene decided that the agency acted without statutory authority to revoke the security
clearance without confrontation, the Courts decision cited strong due process principles:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurispru-
dence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures
an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact find-
ings, the evidence used to prove the Governments case must be disclosed
to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even
more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individ-
uals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers
orpersonsmotivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of
confrontation and cross-examination.
See id. at 496. As William Kuehnle has noted, the Courts strong language on the right of
confrontation may have been due to the extreme secrecy of the evidence (as opposed to the
garden-varietyhearsayadmitted in civil cases, whereall parties knowwho wrote the document).
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Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness,259 the Court determined that due pro-
cess required confrontation when the New York State Bar excluded an applicant who
had passed the bar exam but was denied bar membership because of ex parte state-
ments about his bad character.260 In the 1970 case Goldberg v. Kelly,261 the Court, hold-
ing that due process required a hearing on termination of welfare benefits prior to
the termination, stated, In almost every setting where important decisions turn on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses.262 The Supreme Court has held that there is some right to confron-
tation in parole and probation revocation hearings,263 prison disciplinary hearings,264
and hearings prior to the transfer of an inmate to a mental institution.265 However, the
Court in these cases reasoned that confrontation rights could be denied if there is a gov-
ernment interest (i.e., safety) that outweighs the right to cross-examine witnesses.266
See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 829, 86365 (200405) (discussing Greene). But see supra note 177 (discuss-
ing the Courts decision in Jay, decided three years before Greene, where the Court did not
consider confrontation rights in an immigration case despite the fact that secret evidence was
used to deny discretionary relief).
259 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
260 Id. at 10506; see also id. at 103 (citing Greene, 360 U.S. at 492, 49697) ([P]ro-
cedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word
deprives a person of his livelihood.).
261 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
262 Id. at 269. Under the citys existing procedures, which gave a hearing after the termina-
tion of benefits, the welfare recipient was not permitted to present evidence or confront or
cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 268. The Court held that [t]hese omissions are fatal
to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. Id. In the case of Richardson v. Perales,
the Court distinguished Goldberg on its facts, stating that the rejection of disability benefits
did not involve as serious of a deprivation as terminating welfare benefits. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 40607 (1971); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340
(1976) (distinguishing Goldberg and holding that for the termination of disability benefits
due process did not require a pre-termination hearing partially because eligibility for
disability benefits is not based upon financial need as is welfare benefits). Additionally, the
Perales Court was not concerned about the credibility or veracity of the reports, as would be
the case in evidence submitted in a welfare termination proceeding. Perales, 402 U.S. at 407.
The Court in Mathews later confirmed that hearsay reports such as unbiased medical reports
in SSI disability cases are inherently reliable and thus limited confrontation rights when these
reports were introduced. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
263 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 48889, 491 (1972). Several courts of appeals have rejected an application of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause in parole revocation hearings following the Supreme
Courts decision in Crawford. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 530 F.3d 666, 66768 (8th Cir.
2008); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2006).
264 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 586 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
265 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 49496 (1980).
266 See id. at 496 (The interests of the State in avoiding disruption was recognized by
limiting in appropriate circumstances the prisoners right to call witnesses, to confront and
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In administrative law, the 1971 case of Richardson v. Perales267 is instructive.
In Perales, the Court considered whether the Social Security Administration could
deny social security disability benefits based on a hearsay report.268 The hearsay report
at issue was a doctors report; the doctor was not subjected to cross-examination,
although the claimant had not sought to subpoena the doctor.269 The hearing ex-
aminer also called an independent medical examiner, who was cross-examined and
provided evidence that was consistent with the hearsay report.270 The claimant,
however, presented medical reports with diagnoses that conflicted with the hearsay
report.271 The hearing administrator based his decision on the hearsay evidence.272
The Court held that the hearing examiners decision did not violate the Social
Security Act (which provided for relaxed rules of evidence),273 the Administrative
Procedures Act (which the Court described as consistent with the Social Security
Act),274 or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.275 The Court allowed
the agency to base its decision on hearsay evidence and dispensed with the right of
confrontation and cross-examination because there were a variety of factors that
indicated the reliability and probative value of the evidence.276
cross examine.); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that due process in prison disciplinaryproceedings should include a general
right to cross-examination, but recognizing that there may be circumstances in which con-
fidentiality must prevail over the accuseds right of confrontation); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
489 (due process in parole revocation includes the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation)); see also FED.R. CRIM.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) (governing revocation proceedings
and guaranteeing an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse wit-
ness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to
appear); United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 2009) (reasoning that Morrisseys
requirements have been incorporated into FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)).
267 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
268 Id. at 390.
269 Id. at 390, 397.
270 Id. at 396.
271 Id. at 393.
272 Id. at 396.
273 Id. at 400 (Evidence may be received at any hearing before the Secretary even though
inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure. (quoting Social Security
Act § 205(b), 42 U.S.C. § 405(b))).
274 Id. at 409.
275 Id. at 402.
276 Id. at 40206. These factors included: the lack of bias by reporting witnesses; that [t]he
vast workings of the social security administrative system make for reliability and impartiality
in the consultant reports because the agency operates as an adjudicator, not as an advocate
or adversary; that [t]hese are routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists concerning a subject whom they had seen; that because of the number of different
specialists who examined him, [i]t is fair to say that the claimant received professional
examination and opinion on a scale beyond the reach of most persons and that this case
reveals a patient and careful endeavor by the state agency and the examiner to ascertain the
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In the immigration context, courts and the Board generallyhave applied the Perales
reliable and probative test for determining admissibility of hearsay evidence.277
As discussed in Part III, there appears to be a more stringent fairness test when police
reports are introduced in discretionary cases.278 Thus, the Board is not correctly
applyingthedue process test, which has created thepolice report problem.279 Reviewing
courts are ignoring the problembynot second-guessing thesediscretionarydecisions.280
When oneexamines thepolice report problem through due processbalancing, the insuf-
ficient weighing of interests is especially stark: shouldnt the stakes of detention and
deportation be greater when compared to the loss of employment (for which the
Court has found confrontation rights)?281 In light of Padilla, courts must rethink the
balancing of interests at stake, because the loss to the noncitizen and risk of erroneous
deprivation can be considered greater now that the Court has said it is most
difficult to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.282
Is the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause a desirable method of concep-
tualizing whether noncitizens have the right to confront cops in immigration court?283
The Due Process Clause accommodates the necessary shades of gray between civil
and criminal284 and is attractive to courts because of its flexibility.285 Yet flexibility
means that courts can choose an outcome-determinative balance to avoid bestowing
too many rights upon litigants. As the Supreme Court stated in Crawford, judges,
like other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights
of the people so the Framers were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial
hands.286 For this reason, [b]y replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with
truth; there was no inconsistency in the reports of five specialists; that the claimant did not
take advantage of the opportunity to subpoena these doctors; the longstanding practice of
courts recognizing the reliability and probative worth of written medical reports even in
formal trials and admitting them as an exception to the hearsay rule; that courts reviewing
social security disability cases routinely have recognized the reliability and probative value
of medical reports; and that the cost of live medical testimony at each hearing is too burden-
some with 20,000 disability cases heard annually. Id.
277 See supra Part III.A.
278 See supra Part III.B.
279 See supra Part III.B.
280 See supra Part III.B.
281 See, e.g., Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 10506 (1963); cf.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (holding that the Department of Defense was
unauthorized to deprive petitioner of employment in a proceeding in which he was not
afforded confrontation rights).
282 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (quoting United States v. Russell, 686
F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. 1982)).
283 See generally Traum, supra note 248 (arguing that while the Sixth Amendment mayserve
as an importantguidepost, courts should tailorprocedural protections to the Due ProcessClause).
284 W. David Ball, TheCivil Caseat the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In reWinship, Stigma,
and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 122 (2011).
285 Kanstroom, supra note 211, at 1898.
286 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
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open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.287 To quote Richard
Friedman, Balancing tests are not very good protectors of rights, because a judge
disposed to rule against the right will generallyhave an easyenough time finding ample
weight on the other side of the balance.288
Take, for example, the right to court-appointed counsel in immigration court.
In 1975, the Sixth Circuit in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS289 applied the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause and found that in some cases due process would require court-
appointed counsel.290 In Mr. Aguilera-Enriquezs case, however, fundamental fairness
did not require the appointment of counsel because the court reasoned that a lawyer
would not have made a difference in the outcome of the proceedings.291 In the almost
forty years following Aguilera-Enriquez, no court has held that due process requires
the appointment of counsel in an immigration case.292
A case-by-case assessment of whether a police report is untrustworthy enough to
require confrontation can be skewed by courts biases against politically disfavored
defendants and in favor of other criminal justice actors such as police.293 As Peter
Markowitz has discussed, the existence of such biases counsel in favor of the hard
floor rights that apply in criminal cases, as compared to the Mathews balancing
test.294 Although there is sufficient academic critique about the unreliability of police
reports,295 it would be difficult on a case-by-case basis to argue that the circumstances
in a given case indicate lack of trustworthiness. This test pits the noncitizens word
against that of the police officer. The bias in favor of criminal justice actors such as
police, who are regular collaborators with courts in the administration of justice,296
287 Id. at 6768.
288 Friedman, supra note 89, at 1031. Friedman also argues that balancing tests can create
inconsistent results since they are highly case-specific in their application and can demand
great expenditure of appellate resources in order to not cede too much power to trial judges.
Id.
289 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
290 Id. at 568.
291 Id. at 569.
292 Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1503 (It turns out, however, that fundamental fairness
of this variant virtually never seems to require counsel.). In Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767
F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010), the district court required government-paid counsel for
unrepresented, indigent mentally ill detainees. Ingrid Eagly describes the decision as grounded
in due process logic, although the decision to appoint counsel was to provide an accommo-
dation under the Rehabilitation Act. See Eagly, supra note 251, at 2303.
293 Markowitz, supra note 215, at 1354.
294 Id. at 135255.
295 See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 60, at 460 (Police officers can be expected to omit, redact,
and even lie on their police reports, sworn or unsworn.); Fisher, supra note 60, at 6 (Police
reports may mislead by misstating facts, omitting facts, or a combination of both.); Zeidman,
supra note 60, at 324 (The belief that police falsification is ubiquitous is widely held.).
296 See Markowitz, supra note 215, at 1354 (citing Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006)).
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means that the noncitizen faces an uphill battle trying to argue that the police report
in his case lacks trustworthiness.297 Moreover, noncitizens, particularly those who
are pro se, may not have access to enough facts to adequately prove that a report is
untrustworthy.298
Flexibility also means it is easier to reject rights because they are expensive.299
Ensuring a police officers availability to testify in immigration court imposes costs
on the government: time spent away from the demands of the officers normal duties;
costs to transport the officer to a far-away immigration court;300 costs in the form of
additional immigration court time spent hearing police testimony;301 and costs
associated with additional detention of the noncitizen while removal proceedings are
continued to accommodate the officers schedule.302 Some of thesecosts are undertaken
by state and local governments, who are not responsible for initiating removal proceed-
ings; courts thus may be less likely to burden state and local police departments.
A final problem with relying on the case-by-case due process balancing test is
that due process does notapplyto all removal proceedings. A lawful permanent resident
297 Cf. Dorfman, supra note 60, at 472 (discussing reasons why judges accept perjured
testimony from police officers during search and seizure: (1) it can be very difficult to
determine whether a witness is lying, especially if the judges work under the principle that
police officers are presumptively trustworthy; . . . (2) judges dislike excluding probative evi-
dence; (3) judges are often predisposed to believe that the defendant is guilty; (4) assuming
a swearing contest between the defendant and the police officer, judges are likely to disbelieve
the defendant; and . . . (5) judges do not like to call police officers liars (footnotes omitted)
(citing Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 132124 (1994))).
298 Cf. Wilson, supra note 60, at 27 (arguing that Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),
which permits the challenge to an officers sworn statements in a warrant application if the
defendant can prove falsification of police affidavit, places a significant evidentiary burden
on the defendant given the small likelihood that a challenger will have access to evidence
sufficient to demonstrate deceit by the police).
299 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (Financial cost alone is not a control-
ling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior
to some administrative decision. But the governments interest, and hence that of the public,
in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.).
300 Removal proceedings often do not occur in the location where the arrest that led to the
proceedings took place because, among other reasons, removal proceedings can be initiated
years after the arrest and conviction and immigration detainees are frequently transferred
from one jurisdiction to another due to bed space. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández,
Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons
Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 17, 1920 (2011) (describing
rise in the number of transfers of immigration detainees in a decade).
301 Immigration courts nationwide already are burdened by managing the largest caseload
the immigration court system has ever seen. Designation of Temporary Immigration Judges,
79 Fed. Reg. 39,953 (July 11, 2014) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
302 The government pays approximately $159 a day to detain a noncitizen. See The Math
of Immigration Detention, NATLIMMIGR.F. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.immigrationforum
.org/blog/themathofimmigrationdetention/.
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facing deportation has different due process rights than a noncitizen who is seeking
admission to the United States. The lawful permanent resident has the strongest due
process rights;303 the noncitizen who has not yet been admitted to the United States
has none.304 One might wonder why courts should be concerned with the rights of
persons who have not yet been admitted to the United States. After all, those seeking
visas to come to the United States do not find themselves in immigration court; nor
should they be able to claim the protections of the U.S. Constitution.305 There are,
however, noncitizens who were paroled into the United States for humanitarian reasons
and years later sought to be admitted to the United States (one is again reminded of
the Mariel Cubans).306 Others, such as those admitted to the United States as visitors,
students, or refugees, stand somewhere in the middle of these two. They have been
admitted to the United States, so the Due Process Clause applies;307 however, as they
are not yet lawful permanent residents, their due process protections should not be
as strong.308
While due process rights can vary depending on who is asking, they also can vary
depending on what is being requested. Some courts have held that when seeking dis-
cretionary relief, which is the vast majority of cases in which police reports are used,
303 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 54345 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing all of the protections that should attach once a noncitizen
has been admitted as a lawful permanent resident); Johnson, supra note 239, at 240413
(arguing under the Mathews balancing test that lawful permanent residents should be
guaranteed court-appointed counsel in deportation proceedings).
304 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies only to deportation proceedings;
in exclusion proceedings, due process rights are virtually nonexistent. See United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.); Motomura,
supra note 240, at 1655 (reasoning that Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), indicated
a turn in due process rights because the Court indicated that noncitizens enjoyed degrees
of entitlementand in turn degrees of access to procedural due process rightsdepending
on the nature and extent of their attachment to the United States); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1990) (discussing key immigration due
process decisions from the 1950s and reasoning that aliens outside the United States would
continue to find it very difficult to raise any constitutional challenge to immigration decisions).
305 Cf. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544. See generally Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine
of Consular Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 113 (2010) (dis-
cussing the doctrine of nonreviewability of consular decisions).
306 See, e.g., discussion of Mariel Cubans supra note 240.
307 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ([A]liens who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.).
308 See Johnson, supra note 239, at 240413 (discussing why lawful permanent residents
should have Due Process right to appointed counsel because they have the strong legal entitle-
ment to remain in the United States and the deepest community ties to the United States).
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there is no liberty interest at stake.309 The lack of a liberty interest in the outcome of
an application for discretionary relief is distinguishable from the right to apply for
such relief, where the Supreme Court has held that there is a liberty interest.310
C. Unbundling the Criminal Trial Rights (Deportation is Quasi-Criminal)
Another possible approach is to unbundle the constitutional protections guaran-
teed in a criminal trial. One might ask, shouldnt it be an on/off switcheither the
criminal procedures apply because a proceeding is criminal, or they dont apply be-
cause it is civil.311 One way of conceptualizing this unbundling of procedural rights
is by thinking of deportation as quasi-criminal. This is what the Court did when as-
sessing a purportedly civil sanction such as forfeiture, where the Court was will-
ing to apply some protections of a criminal trial.312 Kenneth Mann has described
these punitive civil sanctions as the middleground between criminal and civil law.313
They fit into neither the criminal nor civil paradigm: they are punitive in purpose and
effect, yet are labeled civil by the legislature.314 Mann argues that these middleground
309 See, e.g., Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 2006) (To prevail, Patel first must
show that the BIAs failure to consider his voluntary departure claim deprived him of a liberty
interest. However, we have previously held that [t]he failure to be granted discretionary
relief [such as voluntary departure] does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.
(alterations in original) (quoting Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 2004))); Jupiter
v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2005) (There is no property interest involved and,
because the relief of voluntary departure (like the relief of adjustment of status) is essentially
discretionary, there is no cognizable liberty interest in that remedy. (citing Ali, 366 F.3d at
412)); see also Sova v. Holder, 451 F. Appx 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that there was
no due process right to cross-examine an adverse witness upon whose statement the government
relied to prove marriage fraud because the noncitizen was applying for discretionary relief and
there is no liberty interest in seeking discretionary relief).
310 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 30708 (2001).
311 See Pauw, supra note 2, at 309.
312 SeeBoyd v.United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (applyingtheFourthAmendmentand
FifthAmendmentprivilegeagainst self-incrimination to civil forfeiture proceeding after labeling
the proceeding as quasi-criminal); see also Austinv.United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (hold-
ing that forfeiture of property following conviction constitutes punishment and therefore the
Eighth Amendments Excessive Fines Clause applies); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to civil sanctions under the False
Claims Act because the Court viewed them as punitive). But see Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93 (1997) (disavowing Halper and returning to the two-part test established in Ward);
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (establishing in civil sanction case a two-part test
to determine whether a sanction is punitive by first examining the intent of the legislature, and
if the legislature intended the sanction to be civil, finding it punitive only if there is the clearest
proof that the sanctions are so punitive in form and effect so as to render them criminal).
313 KennethMann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799, 1862 (1992).
314 Id. at 1801.
722 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:675
sanctions require heightened procedures that are similar to, yet not as stringent as,
criminal procedures.315
Although the Courts decision in Padilla can be interpreted to mean that deporta-
tion is punishment,316 at a minimum, the Courts decision can be read to mean that
deportation is quasi-criminal.317 Other precedent exists to think about deportation as
quasi-criminal and thus deserving of some of the protections of a criminal trial.318
Peter Markowitz has outlined where criminal law protections have seeped into pur-
portedly civil immigration proceedings.319 For example, the Supreme Court has held
that it would analyze the deportation statute under the established criteria of the
void for vagueness doctrine because of deportations harsh consequences, notwith-
standing deportation being civil in nature.320 In another example, the Court in INS v.
St. Cyr321 applied criminal principles against retroactivity when the consequence was
deportation.322 The Court has applied the rule of lenity,323 a heightened burden of
315 Id. at 1862; see also Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L.REV. 679, 720 (1999) (arguing that rather than trying to attach a label of criminal or
civil to a given sanction, courts should begin to develop a middleground jurisprudence and
determine which civil sanctions are serious enough to require heightened procedures; for those
seriousenough, courts should determine incrementallywhich proceduresshould beguaranteed).
316 See Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1466; Maddali, supra note 225, at 49.
317 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (Deportation as a consequence of
a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely dif-
ficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence.); Markowitz, supra note 215,
at 1301 ([D]eportation does not fit neatly into the civil or criminal box, but rather . . . it lives
in the netherworld in between.).
318 Several scholars have argued that deportation should be seen as quasi-criminal. See,
e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 2, at 134; Kanstroom, supra note 211, at 1932; Maddali, supra
note 225, at 30; Pauw, supra note 2, at 31617.
319 See Markowitz, supra note 215, at 131425.
320 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
321 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
322 See id. at 31521. One can argue that this is too broad of a reading of St. Cyr, as the
Court reasoned that Congress could have retroactively stripped noncitizens of their right to
apply for a 212(c) waiver by making a clear statement. Id. Daniel Kanstroom discusses how
this was a pragmatic approach to obtain a majority and avoid unnecessary confrontations
with Congress, but that this approach renders much of the most powerful normative under-
pinnings of Landgraf and other retroactivity cases bitterly irrelevant, as Congress can simply
be clear about taking away vested rights in civil cases. Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere:
The Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 460 (2002).
Kanstroom writes that [t]he Courts apparent recognition of the similarities between the con-
stitutional protections in criminal cases and deportation subtly bridges the civil and criminal
categories. Id. at 461. Kanstroom also discusses how the issue in St. Cyr was similar to that
in Padilla in that the Court upheld the formal line of deportation as civil, not criminal, yet over-
came the harsh consequences through other means; he wrote, The result is a bit of a mixed
message, constitutionally speaking, but one that holds real promise for future development.
Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1490.
323 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6,
10 (1948).
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proof,324 and the exclusionary rule (albeit a watered-down version).325 Given the in-
cremental introduction of these criminal trial-like procedures, it appears that immigra-
tion proceedings are looking more and more like criminal trials.326
Can one argue that there is a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in a pro-
ceeding that is technically labeled civilwould this not require a court to disregard
the text of the Sixth Amendment, which states that these rights should only apply in a
criminal trial?327 When a given proceeding is technically civil in nature, rights granted
in a criminal trial can attach via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.328
Conceptualizing deportation as quasi-criminal allows courts to assign some, but not
all, rights guaranteed in criminal trials.329 Most significantly, these rights can attach
categorically, as opposed to relying on a case-by-case analysis of whether the facts of
a given case require the application of a right.330
As scholars have noted, analogizing deportation to juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings is helpful.331 As Tamar Birckhead has discussed, The juvenile court has histori-
cally been a hybrid institution in terms of its purpose and procedures, incorporating
324 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). The Court has referred to the clear,
unequivocal, and convincing standard of proof adopted by the Woodby Court in deportation
cases as an intermediate standard, which is generally used in civil cases involving alle-
gations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); see also id. at 432 (holding that in civil commitment cases,
due process requires the intermediate standard of proof and not the criminal proof beyond
reasonable doubt standard).
325 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 105051 (1984) (suggesting that, while
the exclusionary rule is available in such proceedings, it is only available where there has been
an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment).
326 Cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 36566 (1970))
(discussing the Winship holding that proof beyond reasonable doubt should apply in juvenile
delinquency proceedings as decided against the background of a gradual assimilation of juvenile
proceedings into traditional criminal prosecutions).
327 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 60708 (1993).
328 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 (applyingaheightenedburden ofproof in juvenile
delinquency proceedings); Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285 (applying a heightened burden of proof
in deportation proceedings).
329 See Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135051; Pauw, supra note 2, at 31617.
330 See Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135155 (discussing the difference between hard
floor rights in the criminal realm and case-by-case rights in the civil realm, and advocating
for a test that recognizes some deportations as quasi-criminal and therefore certain hard floor
rights should apply).
331 See Kanstroom, supra note 211, at 193132 (arguing that juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings can provide an example of proceedings that are civil in name but many of the pro-
tections of a criminal trial attach); Maddali, supra note 225, at 4957 (discussing how juvenile
delinquency proceedings can provide a helpful analogy to howprocedural protections should
apply in deportation proceedings); Pauw, supra note 2, at 31617 (discussing juvenile delin-
quency proceedings as a quasi-criminal proceeding where some of the constitutional
protections of a criminal trial are available even though the proceeding is nominally civil).
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aspects of both the civil and criminal court systems.332 Juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings are, in name, civil, yet many of the criminal procedural protections of a trial
attach because of the consequences of a juvenile delinquency finding.333 Notably,
the Supreme Court held in In re Gault334 that the right to confrontation and cross-
examination should apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings even though histori-
cally those proceedings were never intended to be adversarial in nature.335 The Court
applied these rights by interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not by applying the Sixth Amendment criminal trial rights.336 These rights, the
Court held, attached to all juvenile delinquency proceedings; the Court did not make
a case-specific holding that depended on the unique circumstances of that particular
juveniles case.337 The Supreme Court has not gone so far as to label the juvenile delin-
quency system criminal, but it has stated, Little, indeed, is to be gained by any at-
tempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either civil or criminal.338
This refusal to label the proceeding either civil or criminal is substantially simi-
lar to the Courts reasoning in Padilla, where the Court found that deportation is
332 Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 1447, 1447 (2009).
333 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 (finding that due process requires that the burden
ofproof in juveniledelinquencyproceedings be beyond reasonabledoubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 3156 (1967) (finding thatdueprocess requires right to appropriatenotice, counsel, confronta-
tionandcross-examination, and privilegeagainst self-incrimination in juvenile delinquencypro-
ceedings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 56162 (1966) (finding that due process requires
the right to a hearing, that counsel be given access to records, and that the court be provided a
statement of reasons motivating the waiver before a case is transferred from juvenile court to
adult court). But see McKeiver v. Pennyslvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (finding that the right to
trial by jury in juvenile delinquencyproceedings is not required under the Due Process Clause).
334 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
335 The Gault Court described the history of juvenile court proceedings, which were never
intended to be adversary proceedings because the state was proceeding as parens patriae. Id.
at 16. The Court examined the history of juvenile courts and determined that although these
proceedings are civil and intended to rehabilitate the child, the admonition to function in
a parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness. Id. at 30 (quoting Kent,
383 U.S. at 555).
336 SeeBirckhead, supra note 332, at 145960 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1314, 3031).
337 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juveniles freedom is curtailed, the child
and his parents must be notified of the childs right to be represented by counsel retained by
them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the
child.); id. at 57 (We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency
and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn
testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and
constitutional requirements.).
338 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
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uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence [of a crim-
inal conviction].339
Conceptualizing immigration proceedings as quasi-criminal, although not per-
fect, presents the best way to address the police report problem. A partial application
of the guarantees of a criminal trialnamely, the right of confrontation when a police
report is introduced in immigration courtpresents a hard floor of rights that are not
subjected to a case-by-case balancing test.340 However, the immigration system could
retain its efficiency because the full panoply of criminal trial rights would not apply.341
The unbundling of criminal procedural rights presents a more realistic solution.
A due process balancing test would necessarily include an assessment of the extent
to which the noncitizen even possesses due process rights either because of his status,
place, or whether he is seeking discretionary relief.342 Addressing the right to con-
front police officers under this test may lead to the exclusion of some hearsay police
reports. For example, lawful permanent residents would be afforded the right to
confront a police officer, especially if the police report is used in a legal determina-
tion of removability as opposed to an application for discretionary relief.343 Little is
gained, however, bygranting confrontation rights in such a limited set of circumstances.
Courts already have rejected immigration judges reliance on police reports to prove
deportability, citing reasons other than the right to confrontation.344 Such limited
confrontation rights would hardly solve the police report problem, as the vast majority
of instances where police reports are used against noncitizens include applications
for discretionary relief and bond.345 Additionally, granting confrontation rights based
on the unreliable nature of police reports more closely tracks courts rejection of
other unreliable hearsay documents in immigration cases. Courts have rejected the
use of unreliable hearsay against arriving asylum-seekers,346 whom by Supreme Court
precedent possess no due process rights, having not yet been admitted to the U.S.347
Courts also have rejected the use of unreliable hearsay against noncitizens who
entered without inspection,348 another category of noncitizens with limited due process
rights.349 Finally, courts have rejected the use of unreliable hearsay against applicants
339 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
340 See Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 1510; Markowitz, supra note 215, at 1352.
341 As an example of rights borrowed fromcriminal procedure thatdonotwarrant application
in deportation, Peter Markowitz cites the rights to a grand jury and speedy trial. See Markowitz,
supra note 215, at 1355.
342 See supra notes 29198 and accompanying text.
343 See id.
344 See supra Part III.C.
345 See supra Part I.A.
346 See supra notes 12124.
347 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 21315 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
348 See generally supra note 120.
349 See supra note 240.
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for adjustment of status,350 who are not yet permanent residents (thus deserving fewer
due process rights)351 and seek discretionary relief (where some courts have held there
is no liberty interest and thus no due process rights).352 Granting confrontation rights
when police reports are introduced in immigration court merely extends what ap-
pears to be a subtle application of the Federal Rules of Evidence for testing a docu-
ments reliability.353
Conceptualizing removal proceedings as quasi-criminal allows confrontation
rights to attach whenever a police report is introduced in immigration court. If the
confrontation right attaches to any use of the police report itself, it matters not who is
the subject of the report or how strong his due process rights are when he later arrives
in immigration court. What matters is that a police officer has accused him of wrong-
doing; he has a right to cross-examine that officer to dispute those facts. When this
written recording of wrongdoing is later introduced to prove that he should be deported,
should remain detained without bond, or should not be eligible for or merit discre-
tionary relief, confrontation rights should attach.
It is the universal application of the right of confrontation whenever a police report
is introduced in immigration court that distinguishes this Articles proposal from Peter
Markowitzs Mathews v. Eldridge with teeth test.354 Markowitz argues for a three-
step test: first, a court must determine whether the values a criminal right seeks to
protect are at issue in comparable ways in the deportation context; second, if the right
applies, the court must determine what categories of deportation proceedings require
criminal-style hard floor rights and what categories are appropriate for the civil-style
balancing model; third, the court must determine the parameters of the right to be
applied.355 Applying the first step, it thus far has been argued that in removal pro-
ceedings, the values the criminal right to confrontation protects are at issue in a
comparable way.356 At the second step, the proposal in this Article diverges: while
Markowitz argues that only certain categories of removal proceedings should require
hard-floor criminal process rights,357 this Article proposes that confrontation rights
should attach whenever a police report is introduced in immigration court, regardless
of who is in court and what they are requesting.
350 See supra notes 10714.
351 See supra note 240.
352 See supra notes 31011.
353 See generally Part III.A.
354 See Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135558.
355 Id. at 1355.
356 Id. at 130507 (discussing the need for additional protections in removal proceedings
and the Courts apparent alignment with this view).
357 At the second step, Markowitz urges courts to determine whether factors exist that justify
a hard floor: (1) bias against a politically disfavored group; (2) bias in favor of state enforcement
actors who are regular collaborators with the court in the administration of justice; (3) gravity
of potential loss of liberty; and (4) gravity of social stigma associated with a negative outcome
in the proceedings. Id. at 1356.
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If deportation is quasi-criminal, then quasi-rights apply.358 Should there be a
watered-down version of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in immigra-
tion court? What would that look like?
V. QUASI-CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
The solution this Article proposes is for federal courts reviewing immigration
decisions to find that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires confrontation
and cross-examination of the police officer any time the government seeks to intro-
duce a police report against a noncitizen in immigration court. Given the underlying
confrontation rights,359 the lack of reliability of many police reports,360 and the pivotal
role that such reports play in immigration cases,361 judges should refuse to admit police
reports against a noncitizen without the opportunity for cross-examination of the police
officer. This proposal permits noncitizens to introduce police reports to the extent it
would be useful in proving facts;362 the proposal thus closely tracks FRE 803(8), which
only prohibits courts from admitting police reports against a criminal defendant.363
Why are the statutory rights granted by the Immigration and Nationality Act
insufficient? The statute guarantees a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.364
However, this right is not absolute, as courts frequently invoke the familiar adminis-
trative law principle that the agency may rest its decision on hearsay documents
when that document enjoys a presumption of reliability, as do hearsay documents
written by a government actor such as a police officer.365 There is also the right to
subpoena police officers in immigration court.366 This right, however, does not require
358 See id. at 1355 (stating that in the proposed Mathews with teeth test, at the third step,
courts should determine the parameters of the criminal trial right to be applied to removal
proceedings).
359 See supra Part IV.
360 See supra Part I.B.
361 See supra Part I.A.
362 For example, noncitizen applicants for relief under the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) often introduce police reports to show that they have been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty by a citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv)
(2014) (listing police reports as potential evidence that can be presented in VAWA self-
petitions to prove abuse).
363 See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
364 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012) (providing the right to a reasonable opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government in removal proceedings); see also
Malave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)) (A declarant is a witness when testimony comes in on paper, no less
than when it is offered in person.).
365 For an illustration of the principle that hearsay is admissible in the administrative con-
text see, e.g., Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 39798 (1971)).
366 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
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immigration judges to issue such subpoenas. Rather, the noncitizen must prove that
he has made a diligent effort, without success, to produce the witness, and the judge
must deem the witnesss testimony to be essential.367 Nor does the subpoena authority
of the immigration court guarantee expeditious appearance of the witness. If a witness
refuses or neglects to appear in response to the subpoena, immigration judges must
request that the U.S. Attorney report such refusal or neglect to appear to the U.S. dis-
trict court and request such court to issue an order requiring the witness to appear and
testify.368 By the time a noncitizen makes his own efforts to produce an officer and
proves those efforts to the immigration judge, the judge issues a subpoena, the offi-
cer refuses to appear, the judge reports to the U.S. Attorney who reports to the U.S.
district court, and the district court finally enforces the subpoena, a typical detained
case is long since completed.369 If a judge continues a case to allow for these delays,
the noncitizens detention is prolonged, impacting his liberty rights and adding sig-
nificant costs to the government. Finally, for pro se respondents, it would be unrea-
sonable to expect them to make subpoena motions in immigration court,370 particularly
since they must first demonstrate unsuccessful efforts to produce the witness prior
to requesting the subpoena.371
The opportunity to cross-examine police officers is, of course, no panacea. As the
scholarship reflects, testilying frequently occurs in criminal courts, such that there
is no reason to believe police officers will tell the truth on the stand.372 Years ago, it was
noted that the criminal justice system provided police incentives to lie in court.373
367 8 C.F.R. § 1287.4(a)(2)(ii)(B) (2014). Although beyond the scope of this Article, another
criminal right that might need to attach is the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment, which Akhil Amar has referred to as the confrontation clauses fraternal twin. See
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 131 (1997); see also
Malave, 610 F.3d at 488 (holding that before an immigration judge can base a negative dis-
cretionary decision on a hearsay document (written by the noncitizens ex-husband, whose
affidavit proved marriage), the judge must furnish the alien with compulsory process to seek
the adverse witnesss presence, so that the truth of the writings may be tested).
368 8 C.F.R. § 1287.4(d).
369 See EVAL. &INSPECTIONS DIV.,OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
I-2013-001,MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 7 tbl.1 (Oct. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/e1301
.pdf (establishing as a goal that 85% of detained cases be completed within sixty days).
370 See Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining the difficulty for
pro se noncitizens without language skills or experience in the American conflict resolution
system to produce a witness).
371 See 8 C.F.R. § 1287.4(a)(2)(ii)(B).
372 See Zeidman, supra note 60, at 323 (discussing the concept of police testilying when
giving sworn testimony in court).
373 Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 THENATION, 59697 (May 8, 1967), reprinted
in Radley Balko, How Do We Fix the Police Testilying Problem?, WASH. POST (Apr. 16,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/16/how-do-we-fix-the
-police-testilying-problem/.
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Scholars repeatedly have advocated for criminal court judges to stop winking and
nodding at police lies on the stand and to subject police witnesses to the same tests
of proof as other witnesses.374 However, in criminal cases defendants have the critical
tool of cross-examination to expose the lie.375 As scholars have noted, cross-examina-
tion is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth376 and is
thought to expose any testimonial infirmities.377 Noncitizens currently do not have
the opportunity to expose police lies through cross-examination.
One might also question whether the officers testimony would not simply be a
recitation of the contents of the report, especially if he cannot remember the underlying
facts.378 Would the right of confrontation be useless if it is not accompanied by the
right to court-appointed counsel and funds to hire an investigator to comb the scene
of the crime and interview witnesses to reveal any factors indicating an untrustworthy
police report? Others have advocated for a right to counsel in immigration court,
especially following the Courts Sixth Amendment decision in Padilla;379 thus it is
possible that courts will recognize a right to court-appointed counsel. However, even
without a lawyer the confrontation right in immigration court is not meaningless. The
purpose of cross-examining police officers is to determine facts. While most pro se
noncitizens may find the presentation of legal arguments to be impossible without a
lawyer, the presentation of facts is manageable for most pro se litigants.380 Moreover,
giving noncitizens the opportunity to cross-examine police officers may contribute
to their assessment of the fairness of the proceedings.381
Would the right to confront police officers in immigration court solve the prob-
lem when the issue is double hearsaywhere the officer merely cited a victims state-
ment in his report? Should there also be a right to confront the victim when a police
report is introduced in immigration court? Cross-examination of the officer would
present the opportunity to ask what basis the officer believes the victim had for
374 See Dorfman, supra note 60, at 466; see also Cloud, supra note 297, at 131213.
375 See Dorfman, supra note 60, at 463.
376 WIGMORE, supra note 38, at § 1367.
377 Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV.L.REV. 957, 962 (1974).
378 Under the current doctrine, Confrontation Clause rights are satisfied if the witness who
wrote the report is subject to cross-examination, even if the witness does not remember the
facts leading up to the report. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
379 See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 215, at 150913; Maddali, supra note 225, at 5557;
Markowitz, supra note 215, at 135859.
380 See, e.g., Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that if the
government had produced an adverse witness, the noncitizen could have adequately cross-
examined her, despite the fact that he was without language skills or experience in American
conflict resolution).
381 See, e.g., Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice:
Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGSL.J. 955, 97581 (2006) (discussing
the concept of procedural justice theorythe notion that people are more likely to comply
with law and policy when they believe that the procedures utilized by decision-makers are fair,
unbiased, and efficient).
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making the particular statement. Additionally, for those cases where the victim ap-
pears on behalf of the noncitizen in immigration courtfor example, in domestic
violence charges where the victim is an intimate partner382a judge can hear testi-
mony from both the officer and the victim in order to assess what happened during
the criminal incident.
Why should judges draw the line at police reports? There are plenty of hearsay
documents that the government introduces against noncitizens in removal proceed-
ings.383 For example, the government frequently submits notes written by an asylum
officer during an affirmative interview for asylum.384 Judges rely on these notes to
undermine the credibility of an asylum applicant during a removal hearing, yet asylum
officers rarely appear in immigration court to be cross-examined.385 A police report,
however, is a different type of hearsay document. Its lack of reliability stems from
the inherently adversarial nature of the confrontation between a criminal defendant
and a police officer and the myriad reasons police may lie in a report (e.g. to justify
an arrest).386 These concerns, in addition to defendants Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause rights, motivated the FRE drafters to prohibit criminal courts from admit-
ting police reports against a defendant.387 This temporal aspect of unreliability does
not change when the same report is introduced in a different foruman immigration
court instead of a criminal court. And, as discussed in Part IV.A, Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause rights may apply to at least certain types of deportations, thus
justifying a prohibition on introducing police reports against noncitizens in immi-
gration court. It is inexplicable that police reports be given greater weight than other
hearsay documents,388 despite the fact that they are less reliable.389 Police reports also
are used in such a variety of immigration judges decisions, thus justifying a special
rule as applied to these particular documents.390
Would allowing cross-examination of police officers make the supposedly stream-
lined removal proceedings too complex for the system to handle?391 While it is true
that immigration judges cannot adjudicate guilt,392 judges routinely engage in fact-
finding by hearing testimony.393 This Article proposes nothing more than what
382 See, e.g., supra note 23.
383 See supra Part III.A.
384 See, e.g., Barry v. Gonzales, 224 F. Appx 32 (2d Cir. 2007) (relying in part on asylum
officers notes in a credibility finding).
385 See, e.g., id. at 3536 (upholding adverse credibility finding based on discrepancies
between asylum applicants testimony and asylum officers notes from asylum interview).
386 See supra Part I.B.
387 See supra Part I.B.
388 See generally supra Part III.
389 See generally supra Part I.B.
390 See supra Part I.A.
391 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 103839 (1984).
392 See id. at 1038.
393 The proposal to allow immigration judges to cross-examine police officers is different
fromasking themto determine more complex legal questions, such as whether lawenforcement
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immigration judges routinely do: assess credibility by hearing testimony. Would the
cost of the additional time spent hearing police testimony overburden the system?
One way to make confrontation rights less costly is to permit telephonic testimony
of police officers.394 Live testimony is the means to fully realize Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights because it both permits a literal face-to-face confrontation with
the accused395 and allows for the most effective cross-examination where the trier
can best assess credibility.396 However, the implementation of the quasi-right to
confrontation need not require face-to-face confrontation. While telephonic testimony
still incurs some costs because it is time police officers spend away from their other
duties, it is not as costly as live testimony because the police officers need not spend
time and money traveling to the immigration court, which may be located far from
where the alleged crime took place.
Not every cross-examination of a police officer in immigration court will expose
untrustworthy police reports or deliberate lies. The practice of requiring the con-
frontation of police, however, will encourage government attorneys to use their pros-
ecutorial discretion to avoid introducing questionable reports or raising arguments
that lack a solid evidentiary foundation.397 The regular cross-examination of police
officers also will change the culture of immigration court so that hearings are no
longer trial by suggestion, but trials by evidence.398 This proposal may have an added
benefit to the criminal justice system of fixing the reportilying problem since there
will be more opportunity for exposing any police lies through cross-examination in
immigration court.399
violated a noncitizens Fourth Amendment rights, thus requiring exclusion of evidence in
immigration proceedings. See Chacón, supra note 2, at 162327 (arguing that even if the
exclusionary rule were applied in immigration proceedings, immigration courts were not
designed to police the police, and thus there are inadequate mechanisms in place to address
these rights violations).
394 See, e.g., CAL.R.CT. 3.670 (To improve access to the courts and reduce litigation costs,
courts should permit parties, to the extent feasible, to appear by telephone at appropriate con-
ferences, hearings, and proceedings in civil cases.).
395 In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), the Court stated, In sum, our precedents
establish that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation
at trial, id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)), yet held that this prefer-
ence must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of
the case, id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). The Court held
that Marylands statute preventing a child witness from seeing the defendant as he or she
testifies against the defendant at trial did not violate the defendants rights under the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the procedure furthered a compelling
state interest in the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and em-
barrassment. Id. at 85253.
396 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEINS EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 14.01(8th ed. 2007); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (Kenneth S. Brown ed., 7th ed. 2014).
397 See Morton Memo, supra note 75.
398 See Ashfaq, supra note 172, at 68.
399 See Zeidman, supra note 60, at 33031 (discussing how many police lies in reports are
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CONCLUSION
A recent Washington Post op-ed stated, [T]he problem isnt that cops arent
capable of telling the truth. The problem is that the courts have treated cops as if theyre
incapable of lying.400 This blind reliance on police reports has pervaded immigra-
tion judges decisions to deny bond, to deny discretionary relief, and, in some cases,
to find noncitizens removable. The historical classification of immigration proceedings
as civil has allowed police reports to be admitted without concern for Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause rights that would keep these documents out of a criminal
case without the officers testimony. The due process fundamental fairness test,
which allows the admission of evidence that is fundamentally fair, has led the Board
and courts to examine whether a document is trustworthy before allowing judges to
rely on it. Except when the hearsay document in question is a police report and it is
used in a discretionary case; then it appears to matter little if the noncitizen disputes
the police officers version of events because the words memorialized in the police
reports are presumed true.
It is time to rethink the way police reports influence immigration judges decisions.
If the due process fundamental fairness test is allowing judges to blindly rely on police
reports in making such important decisions, perhaps that test is not doing its job. While
it is possible to argue for a direct application of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause following Padilla, it is not necessary to go that far. Rather, conceptualizing de-
portation as quasi-criminal can ensure the right to confront cops in immigration court.
buried under an avalanche of guilty pleas in the criminal context, since officers need not
testify at trial or even pre-trial hearings if defendants accept guilty pleas).
400 See Balko, supra note 373.
